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ABSTRACT
This thesis studied the housing development
innovations of two enterprising nonprofit community
development corporations (CDCs) in metropolitan
Washington, D.C. Each CDC's innovations were
considered in terms of design and implementation. It
was hypothesized that each corporation followed
similar innovative processes, which also mirrored
for-profit organizational innovation, and that these
innovations could be described by similar frames of
reference.
Relevant literature was examined in order to explore
the relationships of stages in the innovative process
to four organizational frames: structural, human
resource, symbolic, and political. Based on this
review, two community development corporations,
representing adjacent urban and suburban settings,
were selected to explore innovations in their
affordable housing development programs. Field
research was conducted and a case study completed for
each organization.
The main finding was that these entrepreneurial
community development corporations, like their
successful for-profit counterparts, were able to
manage the interaction of their organization, task,
and environment by searching for innovative solutions
to problems and opportunities that served both their
organizations and the community, and to remain
innovative and effective by adjusting their
organizational mission and objectives accordingly.
Thesis Supervisor: Sandra Lambert
Title: Lecturer
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Chapter I. Introduction
It is almost conventional wisdom to assert that
"routinization of anything is self-immolating. It
deadens alertness, attentiveness, imagination, energy,
and reaction time". In the context of organizations,
this assertion leads to the ironic conclusion that its
maturation often leads to a decline in its ability
to achieve its original purposes (Levitt, 1988, 7).
While large corporations have historically received
the greatest attention and investigation of this
trend, government, public service institutions, and
nonnprofit organizations are also subject to similar
phenomena of "entropy over-taking enterprise".
Similar concerns have been raised for these
organizations as they have expanded in terms of size,
number, and significance:
The public-service institutions
will increasingly become unable to
discharge their mission as they
adhere to programs and projects
that cannot work in a changed
environment, and yet they will not
be able or willing to abandon the
missions they can no longer
discharge (Drucker, 1985, 186).
Within larger organizations, both public and private,
this discovery and similar exhortations have
foreshadowed new organizational forms and processes
that symbolize a "pursuit of excellence" within them.
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One of the most intriguing methods to promote this
excellence is the process of institutionalizing
organizational innovation (Peters and Waterman, 1982).
As Knight notes, "Many problems arise in
defining 'innovation' within an organization because
of the value judgments attached to the term" (Knight,
1967, 478). As a result, the term "innovation" is
used in differing ways in the literature. One
criterion that has reached general acceptance is the
distinction between innovation and invention. Most
researchers conclude that within the organizational
context, "'invention' is the act of creating something
novel and useful; 'innovation' is the process of
developing the invention so that it can be put to
practical use" (Khandwalla, 551). Synthesizing the
work of several authors, Kanter offers the following
definition of innovation:
Innovation refers to the process
of bringing any new,
problem-solving idea into use.
Ideas for reorganizing, cutting
costs, putting in new budgeting
systems, improving communication,
or assembling products in teams are
also innovations. Innovation is
the generation, acceptance, and
implementation of new ideas,
processes, products, or services.
It can thus occur in any part of a
corporation, and it can involve
creative use as well as original
invention (Kanter, 1983, 20-21).
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Embedded in this distinction is the understanding that
innovation centers more upon organizational acceptance and
implementation than upon originality. From this
perspective, innovation does not require an organization to
be the first to generate a unique product, process, or idea
in order to be innovative. Kash (1989, 24) has found that
"(I)nnovation has one or some of the following objectives:
(1) lower cost, (2) higher quality, (3) superior
performance, (4) additional performance, or (5) new
performance. Collectively, Kanter and Summers (1987,
161-162) have concluded that:
Innovation is a crucial element of
organizational effectiveness
because it addresses the
organization's potential to meet
future demands, to take advantage
of opportunities and resources
within the environment, and to use
resources (both human and material)
to generate new products and
services.
Within this context, one of the most effective
organizations to emerge in recent times is the nonprofit
community development corporation (CDC). Acting as an
entrepreneurial community-based development organization
(CBDO), these innovative organizations may be defined as "a
private, locally based nonprofit organization committed to
serving a low-income population" and "having an ongoing
direct involvement in development" (National Congress for
7
Community Economic Development, 1989, 1). The emergence of
the nonprofit community development corporation as an
entrerpreneurial organizational configuration itself may be
considered an innovative response to the types of entropy
that have denied more traditional bureaucratic organizations
the opportunity and resourcefulness to creatively address
such issues as affordable housing and urban blight (Roberts,
1980). In addition, the entrepreneurial activity of each
individual community development corporation may also be
considered an innovative local response to such factors as
recent federal cutbacks, the growing needs of lower income
Americans, and the resilient spirit of community self-help
(Peirce and Steinbach, 1987).
As an entrepreneurial organizational form, innovating
nonprofit community development corporations often exhibit
many structural and behavioral characteristics of for-profit
firms. As described below, they exhibit life-cycles and
stages of organizational growth similar to these
organizations, and like these organizations, they are also
subject to the same forces that result in periods of
lessened responsiveness and productivity as they grow larger
and more mature. In enterprising organizations, the type of
innovative activity and growth that occurs is dependent upon
a complex interaction of factors internal and external to
the organization (Timmons, 1990, 517), but according to
Drucker (1985) "it makes little or no difference whether the
8
entrepreneur is a business or a nonbusiness public-service
organization, nor even whether the entrepreneur is a
governmental or nongovernmental institution. The rules are
pretty much the same, the things that work and those that
don't are pretty much the same, and so are the kinds of
innovation and where to look for them."
In examining the question of how enterprising community
development corporations innovate and why some factors
become barriers to innovation, this thesis will review the
innovative processes of both for-profit and nonprofit
organizations. It will then argue that similar to
for-profit organizations, the type of innovation an
entrepreneurial CDC experiences is a function of, and is
determined by, the interaction of the CDC's environment,
task activities, and organization. The innovating CDC
continues to succeed in its growth and enterprise by
successfully learning to manage this interaction and
adjusting its mission and objectives accordingly. This
interaction may be described or hypothesized as the search
for innovative solutions to problems or opportunities that
serve both the organization and the community.
To support this argument and test this type of
proposition methodologically this thesis will examine two
nonprofit CDCs in the metropolitan Washington, D.C. area
representing adjacent urban and suburban settings. Each
9
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CDC's innovation case study will be prefaced by a brief
description of its activities, organization, and
environment. To analyze the dynamic processes of each
organization's initiatives and to determine the factors
that supported and inhibited their innovation from design to
implementation this thesis will investigate each CDC's
progression into affordable housing development through the
common frames of organizational structure, human resources,
symbolic culture, and political environment.
The chapter that follows begins with a brief overview
of the innovation process, a descriptive review of general
theories and research pertaining to innovative
organizations, and a focused review of the literature
pertaining to nonprofit innovation. The next chapters
introduce the research framework and methodology, provide a
summary description of the two CDCs and present the findings
of the field research. The final chapter offers a
conclusion and recommends areas for further research.
10
Chapter II. Conceptual Framework
Innovative Processes
In summarizing the nature of innovation, Becker and
Whisler state, "Innovation appears to be not a single
variable but an attenuated and complex process in which a
number of critical variables are likely operating" (Becker
and Whisler, 1967, 469). From a similar analysis of this
process, Rowe and Boise conclude that while "there are a
number of statements of innovative processes in the
literature on organizations," the "analytical components of
these formulations ... are sufficiently similar to suggest a
generic innovative process" (Rowe and Boise, 1974, 285).
Within complex organizations, these variables are often
difficult to define and to measure. For many theorists an
area of common interest, if not terminology, appears to be
the "process which hooks up particular inputs and outputs"
of the innovative process (Becker and Whisler, 466). This
notion of "total process" centers on two dimensions that
define the processes and stages of organizational
innovation: temporal and content (Clark and Starkey, 1988,
194).
Zaltman et al. (1973) summarize many of the early
theories of innovation and offer their own paradigm of
organizational innovation, which includes an initiation and
11
an implementation stage and five substages. Rowe and Boise
suggest that "a simple yet comprehensive conceptualization
of the organizational innovative process would include the
following broad temporal stages: (1) knowledge accumulation,
(2) formulation (of an innovation), (3) decision, (4)
implementation, and (5) diffusion" (Rowe and Boise, 286).
Becker and Whisler define the stages of this process as
"stimulus, conception, proposal, and adoption" (Becker and
Whisler, 466). Munson and Pelz (1980) also adopt a process
of innovation, but define their classification as:
diagnosis, design, implementation, and stabilization.
Kanter (1987, 6) offers (1) idea generation, (2) coalition
building, (3) idea realization, and (4) transfer. Finally,
Nord and Tucker reduce the process even further by
summarizing two major stages of innovation: design, "a
series of early events in which members of the organization
create, search, evaluate, and decide about the innovation"
and implementation, "steps taken to introduce innovation"
(Nord and Tucker, 1987, 8).
Characteristics of Innovation
In assessing the content of the innovation process,
Rowe and Boise offer "two concepts which seem important in
categorizing organizational innovations. These are: (1) the
12
amount of organizational and/or societal space, i.e.,
activities and interactions, affected by an innovation, and
(2) the degree of radicalness, i.e., extent of change in
activities and interaction, of an innovation." The first
element of organizational space was illustrated by Wilson
who found that innovations represent significant changes in
organizational tasks and their societal impact. "Thus,
potential organizational innovations might be considered in
terms of their potential to affect the activities and
interactions of a small or large number of organizational
participants and/or their potential to affect a small or
large number of persons outside the organization." (Rowe and
Boise, 289).
Nord and Tucker, stating that "a number of
characteristics of an innovative idea may have important
effects on the implementation process," restate the concept
of organizational and societal space in terms of whether an
innovation "is administrative or technical, and whether it
is part of the major tasks of the organization or peripheral
to those tasks" (Nord and Tucker, 11). Following a
conceptualization by Daft (1978), they state "technical
innovations tend to originate in the technical core (of the
organization) and include ideas for a new product, process,
or service. Administrative innovations, on the other hand,
originate in the organization's administration and pertain
to specific policies of recruitment, resource allocation,
13
and the structuring of tasks, authority and rewards. Based
on this distinction, Daft proposed a dual-core
conceptualization and suggested that different principles
might apply to innovations in the different cores" (Nord and
Tucker, 12).
In discussing central innovation, ones that are
"integrally related to major tasks a unit exists to
perform," Nord and Tucker conclude that "to date, most
studies of implementation have examined secondary concerns
of the units involved rather than the primary tasks." Their
work focuses on central function innovation. These
functions "differ from more peripheral ones because they
affect the major day-to-day work of the organization and
involve activities critical to the performance of almost all
concerned. They are apt to be viewed as extremely important
to everyone; and because they affect the well-being of the
entire firm, their consequences are perceived as more
significant than peripheral innovations initiated in staff
units (Nord and Tucker, 12-13).
Rowe and Boise point out that organizational and
societal space, i.e., the dimensions of technical versus
adminstrative and central versus peripheral innovation,
"provide a measure of an innovation's scope," while the
concept of radicalness "provides a way to consider the
effect of an innovation." Pelz and Munson apply this
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distinction of radicalness in postulating three levels of
innovation development based upon how well developed an
innovation is when an organization tries to introduce it.
The first, initiation, refers to an innovation where "no
solution to a problem is known to exist elsewhere." The
second, adaption, refers to cases "when a few prototype
solutions exist, but are not well packaged," and the third,
borrowing, applies to cases where "many well-packaged
innovations exist; the organization copies one and applies
it with little modification" (Pelz and Munson, 3).
Knight (1967) was one of the first to apply the concept
of radicalness as a method of measuring internal changes in
an organization's ability to perform a task (performance
radicalness) and in an organization's structural
arrangements (structural radicalness) (Rowe and Boise,
289-290). Normann's (1971) study of product development
followed with a comparison of the requirements for radical
innovations (what he called "reorientations") and more
routine innovations (called "variations"). Zaltman et al.
(1973) concluded that "the more an innovation differs from
existing alternatives, the more it is said to be radical.
The closer the innovation is to what the organization has
done or experienced before, the more it is said to be
routine." Nord and Tucker surmise, "In short, the degree of
radicalness is likely to have a major impact on what
organizations must do to implement (innovation)
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successfully" (Nord and Tucker, 11-12).
Drucker introduces the cross-cutting concept of
systematic innovation to describe an on-going process by
which organization's may exploit change. Systematic
innovation "consists in the systematic analysis of the
opportunities such changes might offer for economic or
social innovation." Drucker identifies seven sources for
innovative opportunity, four from within the enterprise and
three from changes outside the enterprise or industry
(Drucker, 1985, 34 - 35).
Kash (1989) furthers the concept of continuous change by
introducing the theory of continuous synthetic innovation.
In a process described by Waterman (1987, 41-42) as
"informed opportunism", synthetic innovation "requires
experiential learning and trial and error as well as
scientific knowledge and information" (Kash, 38). In one
sense, this type of continuous innovation is both planned
and routine. Since change becomes continuous as synthetic
innovation, it tends to become more incremental than
radical. However, by emphasizing change, this type of
innovation also potentially shortens the innovation - to -
obsolescence cycle, inviting competition and more radical
innovation.
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Innovative Organizations
While the above section provides an overview of the
stages and content of the innovation process, it does not
focus upon how individual organizations innovate. One
method of further reaching this understanding is the use of
organizational frames. Bolman and Deal (1984, 4 - 5)
introduce the concept of an organizational frame to
consolidate "the major schools of organizational thought
into four relatively coherent perspectives." These frames
are: structural, human resource, political, and symbolic.
"Frames are windows on the world. Frames filter out some
things while allowing others to pass through easily. Frames
help us to order the world and decide what action to take"
In terms of the analytical components of a generic
innovative process advanced by Rowe and Boise (285), frames
clarify each level of analysis, "e.g., individual,
organizational, and extra-organizational". From this
perspective, innovative organizations are knowable as the
collective activity at each level of analysis discernable
through each frame.
The Structural Approach
The structural view of organizations has its beginnings
in the search of industrial psychologists and sociologists
17
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for scientific management and the ideal form of organization
that would maximize rationality and efficiency. Emphasis
was placed upon forming functional specializations
(functional departmentalization) and grouping them into
autonomous divisions (divisionalization). Chandler (1962)
documented the divisionalization that many American
corporations experienced in the 1940s and concluded that it
was essential to their continued growth. Building upon this
proposition of structural development, Thain, Scott, and
Tauson delineated three distinct structural stages which
have since been expanded to include new corporate forms
(Wheelen and Hunger, 1990). This approach led further to
describing corporate development in terms of organizational
life cycles. Churchill and Lewis demonstrated that these
concepts of organizational life cycles and stages of
development were also appropriate to small business growth
(Churchill and Lewis, 1983).
From the perspective of the structural frame, Lawrence
and Lorsch (1967) note a dilemma in structuring work.
Within an organization, it is necessary to differentiate
work or divide responsibilities among individuals and
organizational units, but the more an organization
differentiates, the more difficult it is to integrate all
the different parts. As Bolman and Deal note, "Achieving a
balance between differentiation and integration is one of
the most fundamental issues of structural design, and every
18
organization develops its own unique pattern" (Bolman and
Deal, 33).
Wilson demonstrates that this basic dilemma also makes
the combination of creative and innovative organization
structures extremely difficult to obtain. His hypotheses
state that "the greater the diversity of the organization,
the greater the probability that members will conceive of
major innovations;" "the greater the probability that major
innovations will be proposed;" and "the smaller the
proportion of major innovations that will be adopted"
(Wilson, 200-204). Sapolsky examines Wilson's hypotheses in
a study of innovation in large department stores and
confirms the effects of diversity upon the implementation of
innovation. Sapolsky concludes that "there appears to be no
obvious way to resolve this dilemma." " . . since a
conflict exists between search and adoption, it may not be
possible to structure an organization that has both a wide
range of search and a high rate of adoption" (Sapolsky,
509).
Resolution of this dilemma is central to the structural
approach to innovation. Early research by Burns and Stalker
(1961) confirmed that the type of organizational
sub-structuring often dictated the organization's
suitability to its environment. They proposed that "a
'mechanistic' structure, with its emphasis on the
19
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centralization of decision-making and bureaucratic rules and
procedures, appears well suited to organizations operating
in a relatively stable environment," while "a more 'organic'
structure, with the decentralization of decision making and
flexible procedures, is more appropriate" in a constantly
changing environment (Wheelen and Hunger, 250-251). A model
developed by Utterback (1971) deals with similar conditions
at the level of the entire organization. It describes three
sub-processes of technical innovation: (1) idea generation,
(2) problem solving and (3) implementation and diffusion.
"One obvious conclusion to be drawn from Utterback's model
is that for innovations beyond the level of the individual
and perhaps small groups generally, specialized functions
will be required from various organizational sub-processes
(Rowe and Boise, 286).
Structuralist repeatedly make the jump from specialized
functions to specialized units within a complex
organization. Nord and Tucker cite numerous works that
support conclusions similar to Burns and Stalker's regarding
the design and implementation of innovation (Nord and
Tucker, 16). For example, Duncan concludes that
organizations must be ambidextrous if they are to innovate
successfully. "(T)he organization has to shift its
structure as it moves through the various stages of
innovation" (Duncan, 179). Mintzberg (1989), whose work
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also bridges the structural frame, suggests that simple
structures within a larger organization, small and
relatively undifferentiated, may hold the key to successful
implementation of change.
This orientation to change was most evident in the
study of entrepreneurship. Schumpeter (1949) was one of
the early researchers to explore innovation from the
perspective of organizational managers and entrepreneurship.
Works by Bennis (1966) introduced the concept of change in
terms of adaptive temporary systems. This is similar to the
concept of parallel structures developed by Stein and Kanter
(1980) "who suggest that a formally sanctioned but temporary
organization - the parallel organization - existing side by
side with the more permanent formal organization can aid
implementation of innovation" (Nord and Tucker, 18). Later
work by Kanter (1983) introduced the concept of entrepre -
neurial change within organizations that foreshadowed the
more general interest in intrapreneurship (Pinchot,1985).
These works supplanted the findings of contingency theory,
which focused upon "a conceptual framework with which to
design organizations according to the tasks they are trying
to perform" (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967, 158).
As a bridge, the contingency theory emphasizes "that
the appropriate pattern of organization is contingent on the
nature of the work to be done and on the particular needs of
21
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the people involved" (Morse and Lorsch, 1970, 62). On this
basis, Mintzberg derives five natural organizational
configurations: simple structure, machine bureaucracy,
professional bureaucracy, divisionalized form, and adhocracy
(Mintzberg, 1981). Johnston and Lawrence (1988) have added
the value adding partnership to symbolize the network as a
new organizational form. "The fact that each company in a
VAP is free to be different from the others creates a
diversity that can be the seedbed of innovation. . . . To
a great extent, VAPs have the best of both worlds: the
coordination and scale associated with large companies and
the flexibility, creativity, and low overhead usually found
in small companies (99).
Structure and Nonprofit Organizations
The value added partnership appears especially well
suited to the nonprofit organization. Cook (1988, 114)
notes that for small nonprofits, "the avenues for long-term
improvements generally require increasing the scale of
effort." Peirce and Steinbach (1987, 38) found that "the
question of scale, of critical impact, has returned to the
front burner of CDC concerns in the 1980s." Both Cook and
Vidal (1989) suggest possible strategies to achieve scale
which include growth, merger, and cooperative networking
with other organizations. Vidal further describes several
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ways in which existing CDCs can "go to scale", including
increasing output and productivity by increasing the number
or size of projects "so as to make the most efficient use of
resources" or alternatively, increasing "the resources
devoted only to one or two activities, thus changing the
organization's program mix" (II 5-6).
Increasingly, community-based development groups have
been collaborating to promote their efforts and to gain
financing from local and state governments and businesses
(Peirce and Steinbach, 1990, 250). An Urban Land Institute
Study (Suchman, 1990, 1) has noted "public/ private housing
partnerships are considered by many to be the most promising
approach to providing low-income housing. . . . (T)he
term partnership is used somewhat loosely to refer to any
ongoing collaborative venture involving public and private
sector participants in pursuit of common societal goals.
Program-based public/private housing partnerships .
typically systematize and centralize the functions common to
the low-income housing projects they support. These
partnerships generally aggregate resources for several
projects at a scale and in a manner that would be impossible
for a single project. They attempt to create efficiencies
in financing and/or in the development process and to
establish an ongoing production system that can support a
wide variety of efforts within the geographic area they
serve."
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Aiken and Hage (70) have noted the "importance of
mechanisms to introduce new ideas into an organization and
the way that such ideas can be synthesized and (can)
contribute to innovations." McClendon and Quay (1988, 172)
have found that "to be capable of innovation, an existing
(public service) entity must create a structure that
requires its staff to abandon outmoded priorities and to be
innovative and entrepreneurial in pursuit of activities,
products, and services that meet current and future
priorities." Angle and Van de Ven (1989, 668 - 669) conclude
"the organization must also structure a context that enables
innovation to happen." It is the organization's context that
"largely enables and motivates individuals to be
innovative."
For neighborhood development organizations this context
might be considered a series of common processes that lead
to more successful revitalization - project development.
Mayer and Blake (1981, 41-42) describe "seven processes that
seem common to NDO (Neighborhood Development Organizations)
growth patterns." The significant processes include:
formally establishing an organization, deciding to carry out
programs and to create institutions, confronting the
difficulties of early neighborhood - revitalization
projects, becoming competent in specific project work,
developing a network of relations with outsiders, building a
24
diverse range of projects, and institutionalizing a diverse
range of projects. These patterns are best described as
"the development of key characteristics of capacity."
Clay (1986) identifies five stages of organizational
development that are based upon revision and elaboration of
this study: Advocacy and the Establishment of a Development
Organization, Project Development, Building a Track Record,
Institutionalization, and Consolidation. Both studies
recognize that "not all organizations will go through the
stages in as clear and neat a fashion as is suggest by the
model. Circumstances sometimes allow CBOs (Community Based
Organizations) to skip or combine stages" (Clay, 1986, 15).
Mayer and Blake note "(W)e cannot be certain that younger
NDOs will in fact repeat them in similar fashion as they
grow, even though they may be poised to do so" (Mayer and
Blake, 1981, 41).
Angle and Van de Ven (668) restate that "the more
complex and differentiated the organization, and the easier
it is to cross boundaries, the greater are the potential
number of sources of innovative ideas. However, with
increasing organizational size and complexity comes
segmentation and bureaucratic procedure, which often
constrain innovation unless special systems are put in place
to motivate and enable innovative behavior. Key motivating
factors include providing a balance of intrinsic and
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extrinsic rewards for innovative behaviors." McClendon and
Quay (1988, 166) state that "when trying to create a
"loose/tight" atmosphere to sponsor creativity and
innovation, one needs to be aware that the tight is as
important as the loose. . . . Organizational structures
must give entrepreneurs the freedom to be in charge of the
creative process. They work best under loosely designed
management, but entrepreneurs may need help to know when to
let go or when to delegate."
Vladeck (1988, 73-74) states "the most important
difference between nonprofits and other kinds of
organizations, from the perspective of day-to-day
management, lies in the issues of governance and
accountability. . . . The relationship between the board
chair and chief salaried officer is thus the most important
relationship within a nonprofit." Vidal has found "the
composition of the board varies with the program agenda of
the CDC. . Professionals and religious leaders (and,
to a lesser degree, donors and local government officials)
are more common on boards of organizations more heavily
focused on housing. The extent of professional
representation on the board is also related to an
organization's operating style." Groups that were
characterized as having a mostly cooperative style have more
professionals serving on their boards. "We cannot determine
with our data whether CDCs add professionals to their boards
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as their operating style shifts, or whether they add
professionals in response to the need for technical
expertise and adopt a more cooperative style as a
consequence" (III - 8-9). Nonetheless, Vidal has concluded
that "the operating style of CDCs in dealing with 'the
establishment' has become more cooperative over time"
(111-6).
The Human Resource Approach
"Compared with the structural frame, the human resource
view is less formal, more focused on people and
relationships, and more focused on influencing or educating
people than on changing the setting in which they function.
The human resource frame focuses on the fit between
individual and organization" (Bolman and Deal, 107). The
early work of this approach, often described as the human
relations orientation, dealt with such topics as group
dynamics, the informal organization, and styles of
supervision and management (Khandwalla, 177). The overall
objective of the human resources approach is to design
organizational processes and structures that enable the
organization's members to actualize their potential. From
this perspective, human motivation within organizations
becomes the paramount concern of organizational development
(O.D.)
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As defined by the human resource approach,
organizational development refers to an evolving set of
techniques designed to increase the capacity of an
organization to accept change and to increase its
effectiveness. Bennis defines organizational development as
"a complex educational strategy intended to change the
beliefs, attitudes, values, and structure of organizations
so that they can better adapt to new technologies, markets,
and challenges, and the dizzying rate of change itself"
(Bennis, 1969, 2). Knowles emphasizes that "the key concept
in this definition that differentiates organization
development from other kinds of interventions in
organizational life is educational strategy. OD is an
educational intervention in contrast to an engineering
intervention, a financial intervention, or a political
intervention. The fountainhead of its theoretical
sustenance must, therefore, be the body of theories about
learning and teaching" (Knowles, 1974, 115).
This learning function became a key component of the
Carnegie theorists' model of organizational decision -
making which focused on experiential learning (Khandwalla,
207-209). It also became a potential key to resolving
Wilson's dilemma of diverse organizations both promoting and
rejecting innovative proposals described above by providing
a method for developing consensus on broad organizational
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purposes and goals. "Broad awareness of the existing and
evolving interests within an organization might then serve
to expand the range of possibilities for potential
innovation (Rowe and Boise, 291). The work of Argyris and
Schon (1978) demonstrated the difficulty of translating
individual manager behavior, controlled by personal
"theories for action" into non-impeding organizational
learning. "The result is that many change efforts will fail
not because the intentions are incorrect or insincere but
because managers lack the skills and understandings
necessary for implementation" (Bolman and Deal, 79-80).
Argyris describes a process of innovation to reverse
these problems called double loop learning. He defined
learning as "a process of detecting and correcting error"
and double loop learning as a process of not only detecting
error but also of questioning underlying organizational
policies and goals. Argyris further suggests that "the
chief executive officer and his immediate subordinates are
the key to success, because the best way to generate double
loop learning is for the top to do it." (Argyris, 1977).
This conclusion follows earlier research on top management
that discovered that "(C)hanges in the interpersonal
environment are not accepted lightly by subordinates. Few
subordinates will alter their behavior until they have clear
evidence that they will be rewarded for doing so" (Argyris,
1965, 3). Mohr's (1969) work also concluded that innovation
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is associated with the chief executive's ideology and
commitment of resources toward innovation.
Human Resources and Nonprofit Organizations
Vladeck (80) has concluded "the central importance of
leadership is far greater for nonprofits than for either
business or government agencies...." Vidal (III 5-6) has
determined that substantial growth is associated with high
leadership stability. In this context, leadership stability
becomes a particularly important issue. Fortunately, Young
(1983, 126) has determined that "those entrepreneurial types
with the strongest tendencies toward long-term consistent
venture commitment - the believers and conservers - will
gravitate to the nonprofit sector, whereas those with the
strongest transient tendencies - the income seekers and
power seekers - will tend to concentrate outside the
nonprofit sector."
Kanter and Summers (1987, 162) describe the impact of
this leadership upon organizational innovation. "First,
innovation was far more likely when there was a significant
amount of senior-level mangagment sponsorship, interest, and
support for the accomplishments of middle-level managers and
professionals. This often involved persons at the top
directing their subordinates to produce certain results,
leaving it to their discretion to invent and develop the
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actual methods. Second, innovation was more likely to occur
when teamwork and collaborative mechanisms existed that
brought together individuals from across internal
organizational boundaries and functions. In most cases this
occurred through such formal structural vehicles as
established task forces, committees, and review boards."
Kanter and Summers (163 - 164) further discovered that
often "professional standards create rigidities and
interfere with new responses to changing constituency needs.
Where professionals hold power, as many sociologists have
pointed out, they often operate to maintain a monopoly on
delivery of particular services by restricting entry,
requiring that preexisting standards be met that reinforce
repetition of past behavior, and erecting legal barriers to
clients seeking services elsewhere."
These barrier often extend to relations with the board.
"Nonprofit managers, whose career backgrounds tend to be in
the independent professions or other nonprofits, often
resent the degree of authority and informed involvement that
boards should exercise as a condition of legitimacy.
Conversely, norms of formal authority and legitimacy are
inadequately developed in many nonprofit boards. Individual
board members may involve themselves inappropriately in
seeking to evaluate or even direct staff . . ." (Vladeck,
1988, 74).
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The theories of organizational learning and human
resource development that have followed from this type of
analysis concentrate upon this relationship of leadership to
individual motivation and organizational morale but extend
the focus to individuals and structures throughout the
organization. These roles and situations have become the
subject of the new management style, blending the more
subtle differences between the structural and human
resources approaches. Under this paradigm, learning is
considered as "the expansion of one's capacity - to create,
to produce results" (Kiechel, 1990, 133). Bennis and Nanus
note the distinction between maintenance and innovative
learning. Innovative learning centers upon "the ways
organizations learn how to reconfigure themselves, replace
old rules, improve their information flows, and revitalize
their creative abilities." They believe organizations become
more receptive to this type of learning by "designing open
organizations in which participation and anticipation work
together to extend the time horizons of decision makers,
broaden their perspectives, allow for the sharing of
assumptions and values, and facilitate the development and
use of new approaches" (Bennis and Nanus, 12 - 13).
The New Management anticipates a new organizational
form, the metanoic organization, which in many ways mirrors
the nonprofit community development corporation in which
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"people truly believe that they can determine their own
destiny." Vision and purposefulness are considered the core
of these non-authoritarian organizations. "Alignment around
a common sense of purpose places the task of management in a
new context, shifting the orientation from control to
commitment" (Senge, 1986). In turn, the behavioral aspects
of the learning process strongly influence the
organization's strategic planning processes (de Geus, 1988).
The challenge for the organization becomes "discovering new
management tools and methods to accelerate organizational
learning, build consensus for change, and facilitate the
change process. Management innovation and organizational
learning become an umbrella to unify an organization's
approach to "systems thinking, planning, quality
improvement, organizational behavior, and information
systems" (Stata, 1989, 64).
The Symbolic Approach
The symbolic frame introduces an organization's
culture, its shared faith, belief and meaning, to
organizational structure and processes. While based upon
nontraditional canons of rationality, strong cultures appear
to have a direct effect upon organizational performance. In
reviewing the works of Peters and Waterman (1982) and Deal
and Kennedy (1982), Bolman and Deal (152) conclude:
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In companies where these cultural
elements are cohesive, consistent,
and widely shared, people know what
is expected and what needs to be
done and are motivated and
committed to doing a good job.
Little time is wasted on politics,
sabotage, or figuring out how to
beat the system. Rather each
individual's identity is fused with
the culture. The symbols and
symbolic activity give meaning to
the workplace and provide
opportunities for anyone - from
boardroom or executive suite to
factory floor - to be part of a
dynamic social institution.
Schein (1985) has found that an organization's
character is largely a leadership responsibility of
transmitting an organization's vision. "Vision is the
ability of top management to articulate a picture of what
the organization should be and how it should operate in the
future. Without such a picture, the wellsprings of
creativity are cut off. The vision should recognize the
need for new ways of managing, and it should reinforce those
beliefs by rewarding managers for reducing barriers to
change and empowering people to create. . . . All
employees, from hourly workers to top executives, must
believe in the vision and be committed to making it come
alive" (Tracey, 1990, 132-133). Schon (1971) describes the
process of managing ideas. Policy-relevant ideas are
thought to have their own life-cycle, which begins with
public awareness of a threatening or disruptive event or
condition and moves through the adoption, legitimization,
and institutionalization of a solution. As the problem
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changes, the idea and the policy solution it symbolizes
decays and becomes outmoded. Old ideas will eventually be
supplanted.
Schwartz and Davis point out that organizational
culture may be a conserving force, reflecting choices that
have worked in the organization's past. "It is these
choices that continually reaffirm the corporation's culture
and reinforce the expected behavior across the organization.
(C)ulture is capable of significantly altering the intended
impact of even well-thought out changes in an organization.
A lack of fit between culture and planned changes in other
aspects of organization may result in the failure of a new
measure to take hold" (Schwartz and Davis, 1981, 35). In
contrast, an organization's culture may play an important
role in innovation by "making it possible for focused
efforts to occur at times when the novelty and uncertainty
involved in innovation precludes formal procedures or even
moderately firm guidelines. Like strategy, structure, and
leadership, culture may function to help people attend to
certain important variables and ignore others. Morever, the
shared meanings, goals, and commitments may facilitate
integration (Nord and Tucker, 31).
The "fit" of an innovation to an organization's culture
may prove to be a strong determinant of organizational
effectiveness. Schwartz and Davis (43) introduce the
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concept of cultural risk which may be used to assess the
compatability of such a strategy to an organization's
culture. "Anything that makes the implementation plan more
compatible with the culture or reduces the strategic
significance of the behavior sought, tends to reduce
cultural risk". A cultural risk analysis "provides a
practical way to evaluate cultural change options against
possible changes in the strategy to create a better match
with the existing culture" (48).
One outgrowth of an organization's culture is the
related concept of organizational climate. "Climate is a
measure of whether people's expectations about what it
should be like to work in an organization are being met".
Climate measures the fit between the prevailing culture and
the individual values of the employees. "If employees have
adopted the values of the prevailing culture, the climate is
"good". If they have not, the climate is "poor," and
motivation and presumably performance suffer" (Schwartz and
Davis, 33). Climate is considered to be a crucial element
in human resources development. "If the climate is not
really conducive to learning, if it doesn't convey that an
organization values human beings as its most valuable asset
and their development its most productive investment, then
all the other elements in the process are jeopardized.
There isn't much liklihood of having a first-rate program of
educational activities in an environment that is not
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supportive of education (Knowles, 119). Tracey (133) has
determined that "a proper organizational climate is
essential for creativity and innovation to flower. An
organization where company politics is the way of life -
where managers are more concerned about protecting their
turf, covering their rears, and enlarging their power than
about achieving the goals and objectives of the organization
- is one that stifles creativity and innovation."
A somewhat parodoxical argument pertaining to
organizational climate and innovation, which has its
antecedents in the earlier debate over organizational design
and structure, is presented by the organizational excellence
researchers. Their arguments assert that the innovative
process requires both an encouragement of experimentation by
skunkworks "those small off-line bands of mavericks that are
the hallmark of innovative organizations" and "a climate
that nurtures and makes heroes of experimenters and
champions (skunks)." The parodox is resolved with the
understanding that under this paradigm the organizational
culture is presumed to endorse an organizational climate of
constant experimentation:
If it is a messy world, the only
way to proceed is by constant
experimentation.... If constant
experimentation is the only
antidote to a messy world, then we
need experimenters - or champions
(skunks). And if we need
champions, we must realize that the
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most effective environment for
champions is almost always an
abundance of skunkworks. . . .
Finally, and this is the $64,000
issue: if the messy - world -
experiment - champion - skunkwork
paradigm makes sense, then we need
to create a climate that induces
all the above to occur... (Peters
and Austin, 1985, 136).
Entrepreneurial activities especially benefit from this
sense of teamwork. "Entrepreneurship involves building a
team of people with complementary skills and talents; of
sensing an opportunity where others see chaos,
contradiction, and confusion; and of finding, marshalling,
and controlling resources (often owned by others) to pursue
the opportunity" (Timmons, 6).
Symbols and Nonprofit Organizations
Palumbo et al. (1986, 77-78) describe this process
among public sector entrepreneurs acting as "internal
program advocates" in the corrections field. "Getting
public workers crucial to the operation of community
corrections to believe that they are working toward a common
goal important to society, rather than simply meeting daily
work requirements, is one of the most important tasks of
entrepreneurs." Bryson (1988, 213) concludes:
The management of part-whole
relations can be made much easier
if the organization has a widely
agreed-upon mission, even easier if
it has a widely agreed-upon vision
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of success. Agreement on mission
and vision will embed the whole
into the parts, make the management
of transitions easier, assure that
a concern for the whole will limit
macro-nonsense, and will facilitate
the achievement of the collective
success . .
This symbolism also leads outside intermediaries like
the Ford Foundation - sponsored Local Initiative Support
Corporation to believe that "CDCs are especially effective
providers of low - income housing and other economic
development in this era of federal cutbacks. First, they
know community housing needs, markets and opportunities and
can draft flexible programs to respond to them. Second,
they are willing to undertake projects in distressed
neighborhoods that profit - motivated developers consider
too small or risky or insufficiently profitable. Third,
they have unique political and technical skills in
assembling public, private and charitable resources and
community support at the local level to make projects
feasible" (Grogan, 1989).
McNeely (1985, 1) has found that "community based
organizations (CBOs) have demonstrated remarkable capability
for producing innovations in housing planning, finance,
construction and management, many of which were later
adopted by the mainstream." As a result of this building
ethos of public acceptance, and growing fiscal necessities,
CDCs and other nonprofit organizations "have increasingly
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turned to enterprise ventures to enhance their funding for
social service programs. More nonprofits will look to
private developers for expertise, additional financial
leverage, and tenant linkages to create new public/private
partnership vehicles" (Finkle and Munkacy, 25). While these
resources have expanded the potential development capacity
of CDCs, they have also begun to erode the symbolic
distinctions between many public, nonprofit and for-profit
organizations (Ferris and Graddy, 1989). As the National
Academy (1989, 22) notes "the concerns of the nonprofit
executive are (now) somewhere between those of managers in
the private sector and the public sectors." In summary,
these concerns require that:
Special attention and effort
must be focused on knowing who the
customer or client is and what
needs and expectations he or she
has.
A clear vision of the values
that undergird the organization
must be articulated and, in some
cases, accomodated to conflicting
values.
A climate that nurtures
innovation and positive response to
change must be created. The
workplace must offer opportunities
not only to perform professional
services, but to learn - and
learning requires risk taking and
making mistakes.
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The Political Approach
"The political frame views organizations as 'alive and
screaming' political arenas that house a complex variety of
individuals and interest groups." From a political
perspective, conflict is considered a natural and inevitable
consequence of power and decision-making. Its prevention is
not the focus of the political frame as it is in both the
structural and human resource frames. "Since conflict is
not going to go away, the question is how individuals and
groups can make the best of it. Several bodies of
literature have evolved that deal with the question of
conflict strategies and tactics, including the literature of
'game theory,' theories of bargaining, and theories of
coalition formation" (Bolman and Deal, 119).
The political perspective suggests that the allocation
of scarce resources occurs through "ongoing processes of
bargaining, negotiation, and jockeying for position among
individuals and groups" and the formation and maintenance of
coalitions and interest groups, both within and outside of
the organization. "Because of scarce resources and enduring
differences, power and conflict are central features of
organizational life" (Bolman and Deal, 109). "Innovation
introduces many of the elements that contribute to conflict.
Because it often involves moving resources from some units
to others, some people will be faced with giving up
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resources" (Nord and Tucker, 36). As Schumpeter initially
argued, innovation is also a response to these economic
discontinuities. While this exchange is often associated
with individual risk-taking and entrepreneurial behavior, it
also applies to an organization's commitment and control of
resources (Stevenson, et al., 1989).
Theories of bargaining and coalition building have also
yielded insight into the external or environmental support
for organizational innovation. On the one hand, studies of
community support for innovation tend to confirm that
experienced and extensive inter-organizational networks or
linkages were more likely to generate the resources required
for innovation within a community (Peirce and Steinbach,
1990). From the system dynamics perspective, on the other
hand, there is usually a conflict between the goals of a
subsystem, such as afforable housing, and the welfare of the
broader system in the hierarchy of systems found in a
community (Forrester, 1971). From Merton's perspective of
social adaption, innovation is the individual and
organizational acceptance of a culture's goals, but
rejection of "the institutionalized means of achieving the
goals in favor of new or even nonlegitimate means"
(Khandwalla, 114 - 115).
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Politics and Nonprofit Organizations
In terms of nonprofits, this theory of innovation is
loosely advanced by Weisbrod who "essentially asserts that
nonprofits have arisen as a consequence of unsatisfied
demands for public goods. This is a kind of government
failure argument, wherein the public sector is seen as
unable to satisfy the demands of some groups who desire a
greater quality or quantity of some public services. Hence
these groups organize on a voluntary basis to satisfy the
collective demand neglected by government." Hansmann offers
another explanation of nonprofit response to market failure
by arguing that "nonprofits arise in areas of activity where
the consumer is disadvantaged in his ability to discern or
evaluate the quality of services. In essence, Hansmann
observes that nonprofits are viewed as more trustworthy by
the consumer . . ." (Young, 13-14).
Bingham et al. (1981, 10-11) cite a number of
political and institutional reasons why municipalities have
difficulty adopting innovation. "Most of the barriers to
innovation and improved productivity are political not
technical. The political risk of failure is a powerful
constraint on innovation." Reference is also made to the
absence of short-term benefits, bureaucratic, civil service
and labor opposition, and a shortage of expert advice.
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McLendon and Quay (1988, 166) note that "the difficulty in
introducing innovation in public planning agencies cannot be
overestimated." Some of the more significant impediments to
innovation cited include: a basic inertia in government that
generally discourages innovation and change; a public that
doesn't expect innovation and entrepreneurial behavior from
local government, and decisions that are made on the basis
of existing interests. Mintzberg (1989, 172) adds that
"governments and other public-type institutions that wish to
divisionalize to avoid centralized machine bureaucracy may
often find the imposition of performance standards an
artificial exercise. They may thus be better off trying to
exercise control of their units in a different way," such as
creating independent, quasi - public entities.
Bryson (42) states, "It is particularly interesting
to note that nonprofit sector innovations may be the answer
to many public sector problems. The nonprofits may be able
to provide the services more efficiently, effectively, and
flexibly than would be possible if the government delivered
the services directly. Self-help and community-based
development are good examples of non-market approaches to
finding solutions to community problems through nonprofit
organizations. "In an age of social fragmentation and
indifferent bureaucracies, the (community development)
movement promises a personalized, neighborhood-based renewal
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for the most disadvantaged Americans" (Peirce and Steinbach,
1990, 73).
In asking "What is the explanation for the new housing
roles adopted by not-for-profits in Chicago?" Kelly et al.
(1988, 12) concluded that nonprofit groups "could become
catalysts for neighborhood renewal by intervening in a local
housing market shunned by conventional lenders and
developers . . . . The housing initiative of a
not-for-profit sponsor released the market forces necessary
to spur neighborhood revitalization." In this sense,
nonprofit organizations provide a framework for innovation
by creating systems that prevent centralization and
bureaucracy from stifling growth and change and promoting
creativity and entrepreneurship at the local level.
Bryson (107) has found that "most of the information
critical to innovation usually comes from outside the
organization. The more people in the organization as a
whole attend to external needs and problems, the more likely
a climate conducive to innovation will prevail and the
easier it will be to justify desirable innovations to
internal audiences" "A major strategy often used by
not-for-profit organizations to enhance their capacity to
serve clients or to acquire resources is developing
cooperative ties with other organizations." Wheelen and
Hunger (365) describe this process as interorganizational
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linking. "Experience indicates that there is a mutually
reinforcing relationship between institutional support and
the number of CDCs in a city. Institutional support
contributes to the scale of the CDC community and, in turn,
the scale of the CDC community contributes to the strength
of that support. The more funds are available for social
and economic development and the more committed governments,
foundations, and businesses are to the CDC community, the
more CDCs a city is likely to have. In this way support
contributes to scale" (Vidal, VI-1).
Historically, among themselves, "nonprofits have a poor
record of collaboration, in part because it is more
difficult for nonprofits to share. In profit sector
collaborations, the division of investment and income is
relatively easy: It is a matter of dollars and cents. In
the nonnprofit sector, a whole range of nonquantifiables
enter the formula - pride, mission, responsibility,
prestige, service - and make division an almost impossible
task. In addition, there (have been) no mechanisms to ease
the way for cooperation, to mediate misunderstandings, and
to clarify the confusion inevitable in any cooperative
venture" (Crimmins, 1983, 114). (Vladeck, 76) has
hypothesized that "one reason nonprofits have proliferated
numerically to such an extent is that the birth rate so
exceeds the death rate, and new problems or 'markets' tend
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to be filled by new nonprofits rather than by strategic
entry from older ones."
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Chapter III. Methodology
Framework and Hypotheses
Palumbo et al. (1986, 6) have concluded that
"entrepreneurship is recognized increasingly as an important
determinant of innovation in the private sector. In
studying the role of innovation in the public sector, they
have also concluded that "the concept of the public sector
entrepreneur is similar to that of business entrepreneurs.
Championing an innovation, risk taking, setting bounded
goals, and bringing together a support group of people are
all characteristics of the effective public sector
entrepreneur." Drucker (1985, 30) calls innovation the
"specific instrument of entrepreneurship" but he also warns
that "public service institutions find it far more difficult
to innovate than even the most 'bureaucratic' company
(177). "
As enterprising organizations, nonprofit community
development corporations were created to break away from the
traditional beliefs that "nonprofits are excessively risk -
averse" (Vladeck, 76). This thesis first hypothsizes that
enterprising nonprofit community development corporations,
like other entrepreneurial organizations, are an
organizational form that promotes innovation.
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In focusing upon the incentives and constraints of
innovation, Downs and Mohr (1976, 706) conclude that "it is
helpful to employ an innovation - decision design, a
consideration of the unit of analysis as an organization in
relation to an innovation. Within this framework, each
organization experiences the various stages of innovation
within its specific organizational context. "The unit of
analysis is no longer the organization but the organization
with respect to a particular innovation, no longer the
innovation, but the innovation with respect to a particular
organization" (Ibid.). Kanter (1987, 5) suggests
innovation study "requires a dynamic model - a combination
of a 'variance' model of the factors influencing innovation
and a 'process' model showing how innovation unfolds."
In terms of process, numerous authors have noted the
uncertain path organizations follow in their development and
in their implementation of innovation. Slevin and Covin
(1990) introduce the concept of "cycling" to describe "the
evolution of strategic and structural arrangements in
organizations" as they proceed through periods or stages of
stability and innovation in their development. Kanter
(1987, 5) recognizes that "stage models do not always
adequately capture the give - and - take of innovation, and
they risk artificially segmenting the process. But I
propose that the structural and social conditions for
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innovation can be understood best if the innovation process
is divided into its major tasks."
Numerous researchers of innovation have drawn the
same conclusion. In adopting Pelz and Munson's (1980) four
stage process of innovation in their own research, Nord and
Tucker (9) explain that it was "because it links the stages
systematically to particular types of innovation and because
our pilot work suggested their model fits well with the
particular innovation we studied." As a second hypothesis,
this thesis postulates that the factors influencing
innovation within enterprising nonprofit community
development corporations follow generic stages of innovation
that can be chronicled from design to implementation.
In the context of these stages of the innovation
process, Bolman and Deal's four frames for understanding
human organizations are utilized by this thesis to describe
the factors influencing innovation within each nonprofit
community development corporation observed. While each
frame is considered individually, their interaction is also
critical to a full understanding of organizational
innovation, since "all organizations are multiple
realities. Every event can be interpreted in a number of
ways. The comparison across the frames helps to clarify
many cases of confusion and conflict" (Bolman and Deal,
246).
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As a third hypothesis, this thesis postulates that the
factors influencing innovation within enterprising nonprofit
community development corporations are discernable as a
collective vision of the four organizational frames:
structural, human resource, symbolic and political.
The Study Design
Investigation of organizational innovation represents
"a kind of detective work in which the author sets out to
investigate in detail the workings of a particular
institution or program with a view towards uncovering the
life history and evolution of some deliberate attempt to
innovate and implement" (Nelson and Yates, 1978, ix).
Minkes (1987, 85) states:
The study of innovation and of
its management involves a variety
of disciplines and business
functions: economics, organization
theory, psychology, marketing, and
so on. It is also part of the
process of strategic change,
because innovation introduces new
products and methods and changes in
corporate structure. Moreover,
innovation can be looked at as a
question of how organizations
learn, how the managers within them
come to make changes and to adapt
to them.
Yin et al. (1977, 19) have found that the case study
is an appropriate methodology for this type of exploration.
"(T)he case study has had wide use because it can focus on
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an organizational change and can cover the peculiar flavor,
setting, and people that are likely to explain what happened
and why. A good case study attempts to capture the unique
blend of events occurring in an organization, much as the
clinical approach in psychology is able to present the
unique situation and personal background involved in
analyzing an individual's behavior."
The aggregation and analysis of the evidence in case
studies involves two procedures: "(1) the definition and the
identification of case studies describing factors in the
innovative process, and (2) the systematic extraction of the
information from each case study to allow subsequent
aggregation" (Yin, 20). A general problem applying to most
innovation studies is the need to study the process during a
sufficiently long period of time (Vedin, 1980, 18). Because
the evidence of change must be examined over time, this
study often takes a narrative, longitudinal view (Jelenik,
1979, xx). This process is similar to the four step design
utilized by Mintzberg and Waters (1982, 466-467) "to track
strategies and the processes by which they form in
organizations." These steps involved: collection of basic
data, inference of patterns and periods, investigation of
each period, and building of theory.
Because of its duration and the complexity of its
concepts, innovation studies often require the utilization
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of conceptually - defined variables, such as attitudes and
opinions, gained through interviews and surveys, as well as
more directly measurable indicators gained by observation.
To obviate these difficulties, this study utilized several
methodologies including review of written materials,
participant observation, and the use of open-ended research
questions. Each case survey was designed to cover both the
characteristics of the organization and the innovation being
studied, as well as the outcomes of the innovation
experience.
For this study, the steps in the research process
involved selection of the nonprofits to be investigated, the
identification of the innovation to be studied, definition
of the innovation stages to be utilized, and the exploration
of the innovation through the four organizational frames:
structural, human resource, symbolic, and political. The
final step in this research process is the analysis of the
field data from the perspectives of the innovation stages,
representing the innovation process, and the organizational
frames, representing the factors promoting or inhibiting
innovation.
Nonprofit selection
Two nonprofits in the metropolitan Washington, D. C.
area, the Montgomery Housing Partnership (MHP) and
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Ministries United to Support Community Life Endeavors
(MUSCLE), were selected for this study. The latter
represents the inner city orientation of central Washington
and the former, the suburban focus of adjacent Montgomery
County. While different in many aspects, the city of
Washington and Montgomery County share a common economic
base and the political culture of the nation's capital. The
two community development corporations also share
affordable housing as a principal focus of their
organizational mission and a reputation for being
innovative and entrepreneurial.
Innovation identification
As described above, this thesis considers the
organization in relation to an innovation as its unit of
analysis. Within this framework, each nonprofit's decision
to design and implement a housing development program has
been chosen for investigation. In each nonprofit, this
program area represents an innovative approach to reaching
the organization's affordable housing mission.
Stages of innovation
While utilizing different terminology, most innovation
research has identified similar stages of the innovation
process which move from design to implementation. For
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reasons of fit with the organizational frames of analysis,
similar to those of Nord and Tucker described above,
Kanter's (1987, 6) four stages of innovation are utilized
for this study as follows:
1. idea generation and activation of the drivers of
the innovation (the 'entrepreneurs' or
'innovators');
2. coalition building and acquisition of the power
necessary to move the idea into reality;
3. idea realization and innovation production,
turning the idea into a model - a product or plan
or prototype that can be used.
4. transfer or diffusion, the spreading of the model
-- the commercialization of the product, the
adoption of the idea.
These stages of innovation "correspond roughly (but no where
exactly) to the logic of the innovation process as it
unfolds over time and to empirical data about the history of
specific innovations" (Kanter, 1987, 5 - 6). As such, they
represent, in Kanter's terms, a connection of "the major
tasks in the innovation process to those structural
arrangements and social patterns which facilitate each"
(57).
Organizational Frames
The four frames of organizational analysis -
structural, human resource, symbolic, and political - were
chosen for their ability to describe and explore the factors
of innovation in general and within each nonprofit. By
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combining the frames, cross-cutting issues can be examined
within each organization and comparisions made across cases.
In addition to field observation and review of documents,
the four research questions utilized by Nord and Tucker (52)
were employed to explore these frames through open - ended
interviews conducted at each case site:
1. What types of structural arrangements facilitated
implementation of innovation?
2. What types of interpersonal transactions were more
or less conducive to effective implementation?
3. What types of personal and political actions were
more or less conducive to effective implementation?
4. What import did various factors such as the
organization's history, culture, environment, and strategy
have on the process of implementation?
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Chapter IV. Ministries United to Support Community Life
Endeavors (M.U.S.C.L.E., Inc.) Case Study
Context
Throughout the 1980's, the District of Columbia
increasingly became a city of sharp contrasts. Poverty grew
to include more than 104,000, or one in six persons, while
property values in wealthy portions of the city appreciated
several hundred percent. Over half of the District's
children lived in poverty areas, where at least one person
in five was poor. More than 40% of the District's poor
population were of working age and many of these persons
were already working full-time.
Drugs and related homicides and convictions completely
debilitated many poverty neighborhoods. Washington's Mayor
Marion Barry's own drug trial made national news in 1990,
and in its notoriety, disrupted local government's ability
to deliver services and administer programs. In 1990, the
city faced an enormous fiscal deficit, and because of
federal control and budgetary constraints, had limited hope
of balancing its own budget in the near future. At the same
time, many of the surrounding suburban communities had grown
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more wealthy and continued to attract many of the District's
middle class residents.
Many of Washington's more historic areas experienced a
renaissance as preservation became fashionable among the
city's abundant young professionals. Pioneers ventured into
many transitional areas, significantly improving the
physical environment but also inflating property values and
speculation. At the same time, riot torn areas remained
desolate as residents fled, and many speculators and
investors refused to sell their abandoned properties.
Neighborhood associations, largely unknown in the
1960s, proliferated into a citywide system of Advisory
Neighborhood Councils. In 1990, twenty seven nonprofits
provided housing services within the District. Seven acted
as developers, but only four, Manna, Marshall Heights,
Jubilee, and MUSCLE, had significant track records.
Organizational History
Ministries United to Support Community Life Endeavors
(MUSCLE) was formed in 1978 by nine churches in Southwest
Washington to prevent the displacement of low and moderate
income persons. At that time, a proposed redevelopment
project, South Capital St. Capital Gateway, was escalating
land values and threatening the eviction of thirty area
58
families. The original board quickly expanded its
membership to include lay persons with an interest in the
community. At the same time, the Board expanded its mission
of assisting displaced persons in finding suitable housing
to include promoting employment opportunities, community
recreational facilities, and the welfare of senior citizens
and the general community.
MUSCLE began its operations with volunteers and small
denominational contributions. It grew rapidly to seven full
and one part-time employees in 1980. A board committee
captured this period in reporting, "At present, there are no
standard personnel policies and procedures by which to deal
with the basic work environment on a day-to-day basis.
Individual and unique employment and/or personnel
arrangements have the potential to administrative(ly) and
financially contribute a burden to the organization."
Staff members prepared grant applications to local
foundations and the federal government to fund MUSCLE's
activities and staff growth. Board members contacted Marion
Barry, the newly elected mayor of Washington, and HUD's
newly formed office of neighborhoods and voluntary
associations. MUSCLE was successfully designated a Housing
Counseling Agency by HUD and received a $25,000 housing
counseling contract soon after these contacts were
initiated.
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In 1979, after a year of intensive counseling work with
MUSCLE, the Tel-Court Tenant Association successfully
executed a 56 unit low-income housing cooperative conversion
in Washington. MUSCLE began consulting citywide for the
D. C. government's Tenant Purchase Program as a result of
this project. MUSCLE has secured million of dollars in
public and private financing enabling hundreds of families
in low and moderate income tenant groups to buy,
rehabilitate, and convert their buildings to affordable
housing co-ops since the program's inception.
MUSCLE teamed up with the D. C. Housing Department, and
representatives of the co-ops to investigate formation of a
permanent source of technical assistance. Another
nonprofit, University Legal Services, was added to provide
legal services to tenant associations as a subcontractor to
MUSCLE. This research also led to the formation of the
nonprofit District of Columbia Mutual Housing Association
(D.C.M.H.A.) in 1984, which was designed to manage property,
train and inform its tenant association members. MUSCLE's
1984 - 1985 Annual Report observed that "MUSCLE's
development services for tenant groups and the D.C.M.H.A.'s
ongoing management services now complement each other to
comprise a homeownership program which ensures the long-term
success of tenant-sponsored conversions."
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In this early period, MUSCLE's Board described the
organization as a comprehensive home purchase coordinating
agency providing a "full range of inter-related,
comprehensive consulting and counseling capabilities offered
by the agency. This accounts for both MUSCLE's uniqueness,
as well as its unique effectiveness in the area of
homeownership for low-income persons."
In 1984, MUSCLE initiated its Vacant Housing Program to
revitalize low-income neighborhoods and expand the supply of
affordable housing by rehabilitating vacant buildings and
reselling them to low and moderate income families. Its
1984-1985 Annual Report stated, "This expansion into vacant
housing development has made MUSCLE more than a development
consultant. MUSCLE now acts as both a development
consultant and developer and has become the only nonprofit
housing developer in Washington working on a citywide
basis."
The program began simply with purchase of three 3 -
bedroom townhouses in the Shaw neighborhood. MUSCLE secured
rehabilitation financing with a zero-interest loan from the
District's Housing and Community Development Department
(DHCD) and permanent financing with the D.C. Housing
Finance Agency's (HFA) tax-exempt single-family mortgage
bond issue. The financing package enabled MUSCLE to include
an additional 1-bedroom rental unit in each rehabilitated
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townhouse.
MUSCLE quickly developed a more complex 21 unit vacant
apartment building limited equity cooperative project in the
Columbia Heights neighborhood brought to MUSCLE by WISH
(Washington Inner City Self Help), another of the District's
nonprofit housing groups. WISH contacted MUSCLE about
participating in a joint venture to convert a vacant
building at 1106 Columbia Rd. "because it had a commitment
of permanent financing from Aetna Life Insurance Company but
didn't have the development experience to successfully close
any deals." An option to develop an adjacent building, 1108
Columbia Rd., awaited the development team upon successful
completion of the first building. MUSCLE staff noted that
"the $20,000 of income from the developer's fee could be
used to develop the second building."
In analyzing this project, MUSCLE staff expressed the
dual objectives of: increasing housing opportunities for
low - and moderate - income people and providing a potential
income source for other MUSCLE ventures. As one Board
report noted,
Tenant purchase is fine but it is
slowing down. It is better to get
into the rehabbing of vacant
buildings. We can get money for
this from foundations, insurance
companies, and the banks. Through
real estate development we can make
some money/profit and this is a
step toward financial independence.
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MUSCLE's director and Board began soliciting
funds from area corporations and foundations to "enable
MUSCLE to develop several properties simultaneously rather
than developing one building at a time." Grants and loans
received totaled $89,000 from The Public Welfare Foundation,
the Cafritz Foundation, C & P Telephone Company, IBM
Corporation, the Hechinger Foundation, and the Mary Reynolds
Babcock Foundation. By its 6th annual meeting MUSCLE was
able to report to D.C.'s deputy mayor for economic
development:
This year we have begun to
implement our goal of taking the
boards off of vacant buildings here
in the District of Columbia to
begin the process of revitalizing
depressed neighborhoods and
strengthening the economic base of
the city.
MUSCLE's staff received extensive training to perform
their work attending workshops and conferences. MUSCLE's
executive director also served as the Vice-Chairman of the
D.C. Housing Finance Agency's Advisory Committee and as a
board member and treasurer of the D.C. Mutual Housing
Association. Five MUSCLE staff with "the capability to
organize tenant groups, collect financial data, perform
feasibility analyses, conduct market surveys, obtain
preliminary rehab costs and prepare development plans and
loan packages" were assigned to the development function.
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The Board also expanded to twenty four members to
garner "additional expertise and perspectives" and included
lay members representing the broader views of the entire
community. The Board formed several working committees to
execute its duties: executive, budget and financial
oversight, fundraising and public relations, and long range
planning and project development. The long range planning
and development committee developed project review criteria
for the Vacant Building Program with staff and presented its
findings to the Board.
The Board's committee workload increased tremendously
when the program began operation and members expressed the
need for additional operating procedures and role
clarifications: "The problem has been new projects keep
cropping up that need action taken within a short time
frame." The committees required pertinent information
regarding initial upfront costs sooner and questioned
delegating approval authority to the executive director.
Key Board members strongly urged the Board not to relinquish
this important task, and a check-off system was "worked out
to avoid this problem in the future."
At the request of MUSCLE's Long Range Planning
Committee, the staff prepared a report "which we believe
constitutes a reasonable organizational plan for MUSCLE from
64
the present time (1985) through December 1989." The staff
noted that the agency was "in a very good position to
steadily increase MUSCLE's financial independence and
production of quality low-cost housing."
Our Vacant Housing Development
Program is underway and promises to
provide the needed revenue over the
next few years to fund itself as
well as provide surplus
unrestricted revenue. We have also
narrowed the focus of our work to
housing development and development
counseling, allowing staff members
to sharpen their skills in
specialized areas rather than
splitting their time between
development and support services.
Staff growth over the next four years mirrored the
anticipated growth of vacant housing development.
Projections included bringing a staff architect and
construction manager on board to facilitate MUSCLE's
expanded development activities. According to a staff
report,"The budget figures we are projecting for the next
four years represent the income which must be generated
through vacant housing development each year to meet
anticipated expenses. The figures are not cash amounts we
expect to have on hand at the beginning of each fiscal year.
The cash flow situation during a period when a large
time-consuming project is being pursued can be helped by
charging personnel costs directly related to each project to
the project's lender and setting development fees at levels
sufficient to cover other expenses which can't be directly
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charged to individual projects."
Staff recognized the Vacant Building Program as
"MUSCLE's major source of unrestricted revenue over the next
four years" and that "the goals of the program are goals
which require risk" in the form of legal and financial
concerns that had not been present in MUSCLE's tenant
consulting activities. Staff also sought to address the
Board's concerns, stating "these (development) goals and
MUSCLE's growth as a nonprofit housing developer can be
attained through this program with wise mangagement of our
Venture Capital, or Risk Capital Fund. The challenge for
this type of development and planning for it, lies in
maintaining sufficient cash flow to meet ongoing overhead
expenses while being able to budget for steady annual
growth."
MUSCLE staff concluded that the "role of MUSCLE's Board
of Directors will have to change as well over the next four
years. As the DHCD contract changes, the volume of vacant
projects grows, and the Colonnade (project) requires ongoing
attention, the board and its committees will have
significantly more planning and decisionmaking tasks to
perform. Especially on vacant housing projects and the
Colonnade, the board will have crucial financial decisions
to make and will have to interact with the staff on a
regular basis. We foresee the need to create
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project-oriented task forces of the board to work on
individual development projects."
Development staff members also foreshadowed "our growth
over the next four years requiring increased coordination
between the staff and the board to reach both short - and
long - term objectives in all areas of MUSCLE's work."
Finally, they recognized a contrary view that "the
potential need and/or desire for a 'for profit subsidiary'
of MUSCLE to carry out the development activities has been
mentioned in the past" and recommended "formalizing the
investigation of this matter and the effects which revenue
producing activities might have on our 501 (c)(3) tax exempt
status. We suggest that a task force of the board look into
this matter and produce recommendations for the June 1986
Annual Meeting."
The Board also grappled with the Vacant Building
Program's implementation philosophy during this time. The
Board and the agency began emphasizing the importance of the
program to neighborhood revitalization. MUSCLE's executive
director appeared before a community development block grant
(CDBG) public hearing and urged D.C. government involvement
because vacant buildings are "a blight on the whole block
where it occurs. The D.C. government must develop a
process, rethink tax structure, provide money for low
interest rehab loans, and encourage people to work on vacant
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building projects."
MUSCLE selected Columbia Heights "as a target area for
vacant housing development because of MUSCLE's work on the
building at 1106 Columbia Road and because of the many
vacant buildings in the area." Muscle also took an interest
in the Knox Hill area of Southeast Washington when
approached by representatives of the Housing Industry
Corporation (HIC) to "help formulate a revitalization
strategy for the neighborhood." Knox Hill contained
approximately 83 multifamily buildings with 531 units.
Twenty - four of these buildings, containing 185 units, were
totally vacant, and several others were partially boarded.
The Board also tackled the "difficulty of acquiring and
rehabilitating vacant buildings and making them affordable
for low income persons." Several Board members felt that
there was merit to making housing available for moderate
income persons as well, in light of the deep subsidies
required for low - income units. Others suggested that
"perhaps middle income projects are needed first to provide
a financial base so we can do low income projects." Another
member suggested that " we consider developing buildings
with a range of incomes for the potential occupants."
MUSCLE's Board Chairman concluded that MUSCLE's mission
had not changed after nearly a year of such internal debate:
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" We are still committed to providing housing for low and
moderate income people. However, we might have to provide
housing for higher income people to be able to provide for
low and moderate income people." Staff reported "the
addition of vacant housing development as one of MUSCLE's
major activities will direct the organization over the next
four years towards continuing to meet these original goals,
but on a much broader scale. Specifically, this program
will allow MUSCLE to 'buy and sell real property to assist
in the general welfare of the community.'"
The Board's newly formed Development Activities
Oversight Committee issued recommended criteria and
guidelines in December for implementing MUSCLE's vacant
housing development program in 1986: " We view the purpose
of deciding upon such criteria and guidelines as: a)
providing a common framework for the Board and staff to work
from in addressing the goals and implementation of the
program and b) to allow the staff to move quickly and
efficiently to decide whether or not to recommend submitting
contracts for particular buildings once they have been
identified and initial rehab analyses have been performed."
The Committee recommended:
1. Target Population: up to 100% of
the median income with at least 40%
of the units developed for families
80% or less of the city's median.
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2. Building characteristics:
multifamily buildings 15 to 50
units; unit mix based on particular
project and a market analysis of
the neighborhood.
3. Selection process for buildings:
citywide but limited to Columbia
Heights and Knox Hill neighborhoods
in 1986.
4. Type of ownership: emphasis on
limited equity cooperatives, but
will entertain other development
options in the following order of
preference: leasehold cooperative,
nonprofit rental, market rate
cooperative, investor-owned rental,
condominiums.
In 1986, the Development Oversight Committee began work
"with the staff to develop a format for reporting to the
committee on each building's feasibility." The committee's
chair, vice president of a local mortgage company, felt that
"this committee and the staff members involved in the Vacant
Housing Development Program have moved quickly to establish
a very productive working relationship." Mayor Barry
attended the groundbreaking of 1106 Columbia, and the D.C.
government announced that $5 million would be available to
purchase vacant buildings under it new Development
Opportunities Program.
By year's end, a report on 1106 - 1108 Columbia Rd.
revealed that "construction costs for the project were
increased from the $990,000 agreed on in March to $1.2
million, largely due to DHCD's delays and DHCD's regulatory
and cosmetic design requirements written into the commitment
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letter. We communicated this fact to DHCD as well as the
fact that the income in construction costs rendered the
project financially infeasible without certain changes in
DHCD's financing."
A project on Gainesville St. brought to MUSCLE by the
D.C. Foundation for Vocational Training was also delayed
because of the complications related to site control and a
tax lien. The Gainesville St. project had received a
preliminary funding commitment from the D.C. government for
rehabilitation. DHCD designated MUSCLE the project
developer after a public hearing.
The Board clarified its position on MUSCLE's investment
in this type of project: "MUSCLE is not in a position to
risk $20,000 - $30,000 to purchase the notes and begin the A
& E work unless a clear indication of city support for this
project is available. Even with a clear indication of
support, this is a risky project for a non-profit developer
to undertake particularly given the uncertainty of the
results of the foreclosure process; and the use of trainees
for aspects of the rehabilitation. MUSCLE is prepared to
accept exposure and risk, however, because this project is
critical to the overall success of the Knox Hill
redevelopment efforts but MUSCLE must be able to feel that
the public support necessary will be available and provided
in a timely fashion."
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MUSCLE also began its most publicized project in 1986.
The District selected MUSCLE to administer a five million
dollar HHS grant to the District's human services agency to
renovate the building at 435 2nd St., N.W. for use by The
Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) as a homeless
shelter. MUSCLE negotiated a one percent fee to administer
the six month construction contract as a subgrantee. The
shelter project was executed through a specially created
MUSCLE subsidiary, MUSCLE I, which generated a development
fee and public recognition for MUSCLE but did not increase
the Development Fund's capital base.
MUSCLE began such a project in 1987. The Atlantic
Terrace Apartments, a 198 unit complex built in southeast
Washington, was structured as a joint venture with Winn
Development Company using tax credits and Section 8 rental
subsidies to generate revenues for MUSCLE long-term.
Acquisition and renovation of the complex was to be
"achieved via the Atlantic Terrace Limited Partnership to be
formed between Winn Development, as managing general partner
and MUSCLE, Inc., general partner."
The partnership intended "to raise the equity necessary
for the project by syndicating low-income tax credits (both
those available to for-profits, as well as non-profits) and
to support the necessary mortgage by use of rental subsidies
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under the moderate rehabilitation Section 8 program."
Section 8 certificates also assured that there would be no
permanent displacement of any current residents. However, a
financial analysis indicated that if the Section 8 subsidies
were not awarded, the project would not be financially
feasible.
Winn, as a well known, large scale developer of Section
8 projects, had been able to secure rental subsidies to
produce or restore units for low-income households on a high
cost, high gross rent basis. MUSCLE had always tried to
develop low cost housing without rental subsidies by using
low-interest public financing. A MUSCLE staff report noted
that the Atlantic Terrace project illustrated a basic
difference in the development philosophies of Winn and
MUSCLE. "Our gross rents are much lower but our target
population has been more the modest income working family.
MUSCLE participation on the project will add a 100%
low-income housing project to our portfolio."
MUSCLE staff concluded that, if successful, this
project "would be the 1st 1988 project, and have us on a
track to earning 50% of the programmed development fees for
projects started in 1988 and paying out in 1990. Given
market competition, and MUSCLE's lack of venture capital,
this is currently the only real project for 1988." The
Development Oversight Committee regarded the venture as "a
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unique way for MUSCLE to earn a substantial developers fee
without the risk of any capital; and as a good opportunity
to build its resume as a HUD participant while producing
over 100 units of low income housing." The Committee
described the project's fit with MUSCLE's long-range plans.
"The Board has recognized the wisdom of joint ventures with
stronger partners as a way to reduce MUSCLE's risk (capital
or otherwise) on a project; as a way to get MUSCLE involved
with larger scale projects; and as a way to achieve HUD
previous participation status. This project accomplishes
all three."
In 1987, Vacant Building Development represented
approximately 35 percent of MUSCLE's budget. The
Development Oversight Committee began meeting monthly and
described its role in monitoring MUSCLE's various projects.
"Once a project has been reviewed and recommended as a
viable development activity by the committee, upon the
authority to move forward, a member of the committee is
assigned to the project to work closely with the staff on
its progress." Committee members learned that even though
development activity had increased, their original goals
relating to self- sufficiency and reducing the budgetary
dependence on DHCD "were not realistic and need to be
revised in light of MUSCLE's actual experience over the last
2 1/2 years." Analysis of the agency's development
performance found that the "program in 1987 is where it was
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supposed to be in 1985." Staff offered these reasons for the
program's problems:
1. lack of capitalization to
underwrite the start-up costs of a
development program; the difficulty
of the development projects
attempted (The reality is that 2.5
years is the norm for completion of
the projects MUSCLE attempts, not 1
year.);
2. lack of equity capital to
reduce reliance on public financing
for both project writedowns
(equity) and rental (unit)
subsidies;
3. a lack of diversity in the
type of development ventures
undertaken.
Staff recommended that MUSCLE continue raising venture,
working, and equity capital, generating cash flow to cover
operating expenses by acquisition of income producing
properties, maintaining a zero growth operating budget for
development staff, and clearing all accumulated debt by
either paying or writing it off to reach its development
objectives. They also recommended deciding by spring 1988
on whether to sell or substantially improve MUSCLE's largest
asset, the Colonnade Apartments, which were donated to
MUSCLE in 1982.
MUSCLE sold the project in April, 1988, for $907,500,
and staff concluded that the development program had reached
a point of short-term stability. Nonetheless, staff
cautioned that "only careful planning of what projects we do
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will get the program past the hump of 1990, and into a
period of long-term stability. Reducing overall operating
costs is dependent on MUSCLE developing other programs that
produce income and share the overall organizational
operating costs. Right now in terms of capital and labor
the development program is at capacity."
MUSCLE's staff vice president for development requested
guidance from the Development Oversight Committee "as to
which type of projects should be my priority." He outlined
several important issues for the committee to address:
The more costly the land, the
greater the reliance becomes on
public financing and rental
subsidies. Is this what we want to
do or not? Should all potential
projects be judged by whether or
not some percent of the units are
to be set aside for low-income
households? Should we risk venture
capital on buying occupied
buildings in decent condition and
slowly upgrade them? Should we
venture into single-family
development, retirement homes, or
SRO hotels for homeless men? With
our visibility in the community we
are always being approached by
somebody to "get involved with a
project". I need to know what the
parameters are so I can say no,
yes, or maybe. As the program had
goals for 1987 and into 1988, it
needs goals for 1988-1990. I look
forward to working with the
committee to develop priorities,
and to formulate program goals.
Throughout the remainder of 1988, the Board planned for
new development projects and reflected upon MUSCLE's future
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with staff. In July, Board members reaffirmed that "the
principal must be maintained and the board must make a
statement on what portion the board will commit to
development and be at risk. Once guidelines have been
established then information on the amount available can be
given to the Development Committee. In developing
guidelines for types of projects, the Board must take into
account, long term vs. short term and low vs. moderate
income projects."
Some Board members expressed other concerns: "There is
concern on the part of many Board members that our
development projects are not serving a truly low - income
population. While the position of many members of the
Development Committee is that given federal subsidies we are
doing the best we can in a difficult environment, the view
of other Board members is that if we cannot serve the truly
low - income population, perhaps we should not be doing new
projects. Another concern is whether neighborhood
revitalization should also be an important goal." After
several months deliberation, the Board Chairman responded
that "our policy, until further defined, is that low income
housing is the first priority, but if a good opportunity
comes along we should take it."
MUSCLE began to diversify its portfolio by retaining
ownership of some properties and rehabilitating occupied
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buildings in addition to vacant properties. A 13 rental
unit Knox Hill property at 2907 Gainesville St. represented
a first effort to rehabilitate units with tenants in place.
The development staff selected this property for "the next
stage of MUSCLE's work in Knox Hill for two reasons. First,
the deteriorated properties on the street will negatively
impact on the renovated MUSCLE property, and secondly,
treatment . . . will continue the revitalization of the
neighborhood. 2907 happens to be the best of the group, and
has been picked as the leading candidate because the risk,
while substantial, will be manageable given the overall
condition of the property and what appears to be a fairly
stable and reliable tenancy."
Upon this recommendation, the Board authorized spending
$60,000 of grant money and up to $40,000 of Colonnade
proceeds, and directed staff to obtain Section 8
certificates for the project and to negotiate a sale price
up to $.25 on the $1.00 of existing debt. Before approval,
Board members "asked how the building will tie into our
other projects." The vice president for development gave the
Board another overview of the project. " We will own the
building, upgrade the building, leave the tenants in the
units; small cashflow the first year. We own three
buildings on the block already. In the first year, $40,000
of our capital will be at risk. After refinancing, within
the first year, none of our capital will be at risk - the
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$40,000 will be returned."
The Development Program staff "considered management of
our assets as the next logical step in becoming an
integrated development entity." The Development Oversight
Committee endorsed this strategy as a goal for 1989.
"MUSCLE now has the opportunity to take the first step into
management under a proposed co-management venture with
Barkan Management Company, an experienced firm located in
Boston but operating in four states including Georgia. . .
. We will be involved in the management without having to
capitalize administrative start-up costs of our own
management. We will provide some services to this
co-management deal (space) and our person on staff will be
the property manager and learn from Barkan. We will get 50
percent of the management fees on our properties, plus, if
we bring in other properties (other than our own) we would
get a fee for that also." The Board supported this
assessment and reached agreement with Barkan for MUSCLE's
property mangement.
In the fall, one of MUSCLE's general contractors, Rise,
defaulted on payments to his subcontractors. MUSCLE was
forced to bring a $200,000 breach of contract suit, hire a
new contractor to complete the work, and obtain a
certificate of occupancy once all of the liens on the
property were removed. The Development staff stated that
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even though the contractor had worked with MUSCLE for 8-9
years, on 1106 Columbia Rd. "his company wasn't in the best
of shape to begin with. There were delays, plumbing
problems. The help he was supposed to be getting seemed to
fall through."
Funds to pay RISE's obligations were issued from the
Columbia Rd. project account and did not include any MUSCLE
assets. The Board realized that "MUSCLE will therefore earn
little or no fee from the project rather than the $65,000 -
$80,000 that was anticipated in early August." The staff
stated, "The loss of the fee is a tremendous loss to MUSCLE
but there are still reasons to be satisfied with our
efforts. First, MUSCLE has provided 40 units of very
affordable housing to lower and very low income households.
We have removed an eyesore from the Columbia Heights
neighborhood. We have demonstrated our capacity to perform
in a crisis situation and meet our obligations, and lastly
by meeting the the obligations left to us by RISE we have
maintained our credibility in the business and development
community."
Board members nonetheless asked how MUSCLE could select
the right contractor and protect itself against losses when
a contractor failed to perform. MUSCLE's Board Chairman
stated that "as a result of this situation we have learned a
lesson: we need to establish a screening process for hiring
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contractors." The Development Oversight Committee was
requested to "work on a process for dealing with
contractors," and staff soon offered the Committee the
following guidelines: (1) submit invoices and add them up to
make sure everything adds up; (2) review the contractors
financial statements with credit references; (3) payment and
performance bond; (4) an unconditional letter of credit; and
(5) the issuance of joint checks to the general contractor
and his subcontractor and suppliers.
Staff expressed the belief that MUSCLE's development
program was at a critical juncture in its existence. "It is
clear . . . that without major new initiatives and ideas
the program will not become self-sufficient by the end of
1990, and may perhaps become a net drain on MUSCLE's assets.
To a large extent this is related to MUSCLE's overall need
to generate more revenue and create new programs if its is
to continue to sustain its current staffing pattern and
operating budget." Finding available vacant buildings had
become more difficult "as both private developers and the
City have been scooping up these buildings."
In preparing an action plan for 1989, MUSCLE's vice
president reflected on two current developments: "The
management venture (with Barkan) is potentially a genuine
money-maker for MUSCLE as well as insurance that our
portfolio properties will be well run. I would recommend
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that MUSCLE commit whatever resources are necessary to make
this effort work, including actively soliciting business for
the venture. In terms of the future, some genuine
possibilities for future growth seemed plausible. The City
is likely to pass a linked development program this year
which will require developers who receive density bonuses
. . . to either make a cash contribution to a housing trust
fund or build (or contract with someone to build) a certain
number of housing units. As one of the City's prominent
non-profits we should be in a position to benefit from this
if we have product to work on. It also appears likely that
some housing program will emerge from Congress in 1989.
From our perspective the smaller the better because a small
program is not likely to engage the interest of big
developers."
In 1989, the Board recommended the following elements
of an action plan:
*land banking to insure a stream of product for the
next 3-5 years, and an ability to more quickly to capitalize
on new developments on the housing scene;
*orderly expansion of the MUSCLE / Barkan management
venture cooperative development of cooperatives with
neighborhood groups through the Homestead Program (2525
Minnesota); and,
*creation of an equity fund to be used to write down
rents / project costs for certain percentage of units in a
building or project.
MUSCLE's vice president stated, "As I believe MUSCLE's
long-term success in housing development will be tied to the
82
M mi.. Wo - I - __
raising of capital, and the purchase of land, I consider
these great priorities."
MUSCLE staff and Board began 1989 with renewed
enthusiasm. The Board Chairman remarked in a meeting notice
that "the spirit of renewal and rejuvenation that has swept
the Board since our retreat has resulted in an extraordinary
amount of work in the first two months of this year. Thanks
to the involvement of many of us, we have a new mission
statement, we have trimmed down and reorganized our board to
a more workable size, we have revised our by-laws and we
have the beginnings of a new advisory board." Throughout the
many revisions, "the goal of MUSCLE in assisting families of
limited income on the road to gaining self-sufficiency was
thought to be very important." After a few minor amendments,
the new mission statement read:
The mission of MUSCLE is to help
people of limited income achieve
economic independence by developing
affordable, decent and safe rental
and homeownership opportunities; by
providing technical assistance and
training to community groups; and
helping to revitalize
neighborhoods.
After these exercises, one Board member expressed
concerns about MUSCLE's potential involvement with an
elderly program in Prince George's County, Maryland "because
it doesn't generate any money. Also MUSCLE doesn't have any
experience in that area." A Board survey was conducted in
April "to give guidance to the Development Oversight
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Committee as it plans for development activities in the
short and long term." The survey results "indicated, on the
whole, that the Board would like MUSCLE to continue the same
type of development activities and options it has pursued in
the last 3 years along with a willingness to do joint
ventures and pursue providing development services for
non-profits when the opportunities present themselves.
Overwhelmingly the preferred projects require vacant
buildings. This is precisely the commodity that is in rare
supply in the District at the current time, and when
available is very expensive. However the survey at least
shows that the types of projects that the staff is pursuing
is compatible with the preferences of the Board."
In discussing the survey, Board members felt "we need
to be market sensitive. We need to move forward, keeping
our goals in mind. Our marketplace is the city but if an
opportunity shows up in Maryland or Virginia we should take
advantage of it." The Board also discussed pursuing public
housing and Single Room Occupancy (SRO) turnkey projects.
The Board Chair didn't feel SRO's were part of MUSCLE's
mission, yet another Board member mentioned that "SRO's are
an inexpensive form of housing and shouldn't be overlooked."
At the Board meeting, "the consensus was if it was similar
to the shelter project and included an intensive social
services component it would be considered." The Board
considered options for new construction, leaseholds, land
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banking and acquisition of occupied buildings without
resolution but agreed that commercial/office space
development was not something it wanted to do. It would,
however, "entertain any project that is feasible and in
concert with our mission."
Minutes of the meeting reported that the Development
Oversight Committee followed with a "lively discussion about
projects that could be done in order to generate income from
the development program. The committee was told that the
program had operating funds that would last until May 1990.
Joint ventures with non-profit providers of homeless
services was supported as the most likely way to get a
project off the ground quickly as there is lots of money
around for homeless services. The committee instructed
staff to be aggressive in pursuing opportunities, and to
assume that MUSCLE would invest equity in new projects, and
leave cash in to make a deal work." Staff reported on a
potential HUD /MUSCLE effort in Knox Hill to create ten
townhomes from HUD owned property, and on a MUSCLE building
search for the House of Ruth. Additional discussions
centered on the purchase and upgrade of existing occupied
buildings and MUSCLE's future needs to build a management
and maintenance staff capacity and an ability to deal with
other government agencies.
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The Board soon recast MUSCLE's development activities
to include both projects initiated by MUSCLE for its own
portfolio or for transfer to resident owned coops and
MUSCLE's tenant purchase activities under its contract with
DHCD. MUSCLE's Vice President for Development was retitled
Vice President of Programs and the Board's Standing
Committees reduced to three: Corporate, Resource, and
Program Oversight.
Staff continued to be actively involved in community
and professsional activities. MUSCLE's president sat on the
Mayor's Committee on Budgetary Priorities and its
subcommittee for government direction and was appointed to
the newly formed advisory board of the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board (FHLBB) of Atlanta. Staff was also very active
in Washington's Coalition of Economic Development
Organizations and the newly formed Coalition of Non-profit
Housing Developers.
The newly formed Program Oversight Committee (POC)
reviewed the purchase and redevelopment of the Sussex /
Northfield Apartments in Landover, MD. as one of its first
proposals. The project consisted of two apartment complexes
with nearly 1100 units. The properties were suffering from
financial distress and were near foreclosure due to
"deferred maintenance, social problems, and inadequate
management." Unlike previous proposals, "MUSCLE will be a
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general partner but would not be responsible for financial
guarantees. MUSCLE's primary role would be to create the
positive living environment necessary to have a healthy
rental property. MUSCLE would be responsible to create an
effective resident association, create a neighborhood watch
program, and bring site services such as day care, leaving
centers, and after school care to the properties. MUSCLE
would also be responsible to create a project-based
community and family services program. The costs of
implementing and managing these programs would be borne by
the operating budget of the property."
The proposal called for MUSCLE working with Edmonson &
Gallagher (E & G) and others as a general partner. A new
nonprofit 501 (c)(3) would be formed to take advantage of
nonrecourse financing. As a general partner, E & G proposed
that MUSCLE receive 20% of the developer fees or $100,000 in
1990 and 1991; 10% of the development management fees or
$84,000 in 1990 and 1991; and 12 1/2% of the property
management fees approximately $35,000-$40,000 per year. In
addition, MUSCLE would receive 20% of the cash flow
available to the general partners after the equity partners
have been paid and have realized the recovery of their
investment plus their residual value. Cautioned the Board,
"MUSCLE has few hard risks. MUSCLE's greatest risk is
"political" or "soft" risk if the project fails. We will be
associated with a project that has failed which could damage
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our reputation, and hurt our credibility as financing was
sought on other projects." The Board agreed to pursue the
project.
In October, the Program Oversight Committee discussed
the merits of a similar joint venture with Sigma for Barnaby
Gardens. MUSCLE would be responsible for marketing and DHCD
interaction. Most members felt it was a project that was
within MUSCLE's mission, despite concerns expressed
generally about the neighborhood. However, "the committee
felt that without a development budget no reasonable answer
could be given to SIGMA about the percentage of MUSCLE's
ownership." The Committee decided to recommend to the Board
that "the staff pursue the venture and bring back a real
deal before a final decision as to the form of MUSCLE's
participation was debated."
Once again, the Board and staff held lengthy
discussions about the "need for an equity capital fund that
would be available to allow MUSCLE to continue development
projects in a market where public resources were diminishing
and land costs were rising." Staff pointed out that MUSCLE
must either "fund new deals and earn some fees or it might
have to get out of the development business." At the same
time, MUSCLE was awarded a small training contract with the
Prince George's County to implement a 50 unit HUD Turnkey
III homeownership program. The training contract budget was
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for $12,775 with a 20% fee, and would be conducted with P.G.
County officials.
MUSCLE faced another transitional year in 1990, and one
of the chief issues was the "need to invest our capital in
projects, not operations." The Board also discussed the need
to generate fees to support development activities; to
assess the controls and the number of units needed to
support property management; and the need to plan to turn
the deficit around. The Board's goal anticipated half of
MUSCLE's operating budget being funded by development. In
1989, 44 percent came from development activities, but 1990
development projections dropped funding of operations to 35
percent. Projections for development staffing in 1990 also
dropped, from three full-time and two at half time in 1989
to two full-time and three half- time.
Another issue the Board assessed was how to continue
the DHCD contract more profitably. MUSCLE's DHCD tenant
purchase consulting contract was scheduled to expire
September 30, 1990. According to staff, "Financially the
contract does not fully cover the costs MUSCLE incurs to
provide the tenant purchase services. Furthermore the
contract administration is becoming more rigid (a
combination of DHCD fiscal constraints, and HUD oversight),
and will force us to subsidize the program more and more
each year." In evaluating MUSCLE's future in the program,
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staff concluded "tenant purchase will continue as a
significant non-profit development activity in this city in
the production and preservation of affordable housing.
However, less public money will be available and more groups
will be doing it. If MUSCLE is to continue the activity it
will have to be within this framework. Ultimately the Board
needs to decide what place tenant purchase should have in
our program mix, how we should do it, and whether we want to
do it as a DHCD contractor."
The Board began discussing a solution to tenant
management problems at its annual retreat in March.
"Essentially we are proposing to enter into a JV agreement
with the TA (tenant association) to buy and renovate the
property under coop ownership. This is similar to how we
functioned on Columbia Rd. and we are functioning with (the)
15th Pl. (project). Using this method we could move the
project much faster, make the key development decisions, and
prepare the residents more slowly and carefully for
ownership. MUSCLE would secure the financing, guarantee
completion, fund pre-development costs. MUSCLE staff time
would be covered by the DHCD contract. If no JV agreement
was reached then MUSCLE would end its activities with the
group. This method would allow both parties to choose a
continuing relationship, but allow MUSCLE to truly function
as a developer."
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MUSCLE staff calculated that "if the staff resources
were 3 project managers then 12 projects could be underway
in feasibility, presettlement and construction." MUSCLE
staff also concluded "the emphasis on realistic project
feasibility, real commitments from tenants to paying certain
levels of carrying charges, and more internal discipline on
MUSCLE's part in reducing the number of cases . . . . This
argues for a smaller, but more skilled staff, to work on
tenant purchase cases whether or not a DHCD contract
exists."
New opportunities, years in the making, were also
taking shape. MUSCLE was awarded the development rights by
HCD's Program Administration to the first multifamily
property to be developed through its Homestead (Housing
Preservation) Program, under which the city takes delinquent
properties and sells them for $250 per unit to lower-income
households or nonprofit housing developers. MUSCLE's plans
included redevelopment of the three vacant 13-unit buildings
as one 24-unit limited equity housing cooperative. "MUSCLE
will coordinate the marketing process, homeownership
training, property management, and physical renovation.
MUSCLE is considering being the GC on this project in
conjunction with a construction management firm. Our
architect will use UDC students to help in the actual
preparation of the drawings."
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The Affordable Housing Program (AHP) also drew closer
to implemention in 1990. Billed as a program for
neighborhood preservation and homeownership, AHP centered
around a two million dollar equity fund (MUSCLE Partners I)
which would be leveraged to "invest in the acquisition of
vacant and occupied multi-family properties." According to a
staff report, "The vacant building program, and/or MUSCLE
direct development needs a large injection of equity capital
if it is to become a viable program able to cover its direct
costs, and some fair share of MUSCLE's overhead. To this
end we are pursuing MUSCLE Partners I, an equity fund that
will allow us to aggressively create development
opportunities without reliance on public funds, and
excessive debt financing."
The report also analyzed the impact of the Affordable
Housing Program on MUSCLE's property management program.
"Looking to the future we developed a cooperative management
agreement with Barkan Management. A change in their
personnel this past December left us with the decision to
either manage our own properties or get someone else to do
it. We have looked into the cost of starting to do
management on a broader scale. . . . If the Affordable
Housing Program is started because we are successful in
generating equity for MUSCLE Partners I, then we have to
have a property management operation to protect and nurture
the projects. It should be able to operate at breakeven if
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growth of the operation is managed carefully."
A major focus of 1990's annual planning retreat was the
outline of an action plan for MUSCLE's next three years.
"The need for a new organizational plan is based on the
expiration of the last long-range plan in 1989 and the
realities facing the organization at the beginning of a new
decade." The Board chose "four priorities for MUSCLE
activity in the coming years. These are: the development of
buildings for sale or rental to low-income residents; the
continuation of tenant purchase counseling; finding ways to
address the homeless problem; and increased services for
low-income tenants." The Board also confirmed that "MUSCLE
should: develop projects that are diverse in the people and
income groups served and are of different sizes; be flexible
in the types of housing projects it seeks to develop;
continue with churches and religious organizations; play a
continuing advocacy role in housing affairs; and pursue
sources of income which are continuing and close the gaps in
other programs it undertakes."
Reflecting upon the Board's deliberations, MUSCLE's
president commented, "It is good to think in multi-year
terms and to develop long range plans. The Board needs to
maintain its consensus to support MUSCLE's affordable
housing program. We need to broaden our base of operations.
It is too hard to remain solvent otherwise. We're better
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off than any other CDC in town. We have money in the bank,
money for operations, but our development arm needs projects
to do."
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Chapter V. Montgomery Housing Partnership, Inc. (MHP) Case
Study
Context
As part of the metropolitan Washington, D. C. area,
Montgomery County enjoyed the benefits of a growing
regional economy and a high per capita income. The County's
1988 per capita income of $27,831, which ranked 16th
nationwide, was the third highest in the Washington area.
However, this prosperity had also brought growth pressures,
taxpayer resistance, and an uneven distribution of wealth.
County Executive Sidney Kramer stated at the time, "Our
taxpayers are already overburdened in Montgomery County and
pay more than any other jurisdiction."
In 1990, a citizen's group, Fairness in Taxation, had
turned tax relief and growth management in Montgomery
County into a volatile political issue and was seeking a
new tax on development and construction. Also supporting
the tax were the League of Women Voters, union leaders,
and a variety of civic groups. Past efforts to impose
such a tax, which had been estimated to add $4,000 to the
sale price of a typical single family house of 2,400 square
feet, were opposed by the Chamber of Commerce and the County
Executive. The County Council was exploring alternative
tax measures, as well as plans to reduce the County's
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budgetary expenditures. Ironically, the development tax
came at a time when the County was downzoning land and
imposing building moratoriums, which covered about 50
percent of the county's developable land, due to
overburdened and inadequate public facilities. Developments
in the pipeline continued, but at a slower pace.
Even with the moratorium, County planners made a
forecast that "the area's labor market will be characterized
by a continued labor shortage in the future." According to
the Maryland Department of Economic and Community
Development, Montgomery County had the lowest unemployment
rate in the state. A news article reported, "The Greater
Washington Board of Trade has urged businesses and local
governments to help employees pay for housing as one way to
halt the growing shortage of workers in the metropolitan
area. Business leaders believe the high cost of buying and
renting housing is driving away workers, and discouraging
others from moving into the area."
A planning report added, "Compounding this problem is
the rising price of housing in the area. The median price
of a single-family house in Montgomery County jumped nearly
17 percent to $145,000 between 1987 and 1988. The median
price of a new, single-family detached house increased over
28 percent to $232,000 for that same period." A survey
also showed that the rental market was similarly expensive
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and tight. Between 1988 and 1989, rental rates for
efficiency and one bedroom unit types increased by 4.9
percent and 6.4 percent respectively. In addition, the
countywide rental vacancy rate declined between April 1988
and 1989, from 4.3 percent to 3.9 percent.
County corporate leaders were very aware of the issue
of affordable housing. Numerous studies reported on the
lack of affordable housing throughout the metropolitan
Washington area and its effects on economic, social, and
quality of life matters. Montgomery County's Economic
Advisory Council (EAC) selected affordable housing as the
theme for its 1990 Consensus Conference. The Conference
recognized that "affordable housing affects all sectors of
the County -- business, community, and government. Thus,
while the Consensus Conference was originally initiated to
elicit the advice of local corporate officials, civic,
religious, and public sector leaders" actively participated.
Elected officials also were involved actively in the
pursuit of affordable housing solutions for Montgomery
County. County government established an affordable housing
task force, and the former Council President set forth a
Productivity Housing Plan. The County's Department of
Housing and Community Development teamed up with the city of
Gaithersburg to renovate a Quality Inn into approximately
120 furnished efficiency apartments for service and
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entry-level employees at a cost of $5.2 million. A
three-member governing board of the city, county, and the
Housing Opportunities Commission of Montgomery County (HOC),
a public corporation which financed, owned, and managed a
variety of county housing projects, was formed to oversee
and manage the project.
Such initiatives followed a history of government
housing programs developed by the County, including a
condominium transfer tax targeted for the assistance of
multi-family rental housing enacted in 1981. The Moderately
Priced Dwelling Unit Program (MPDU) was enacted in 1974 to
provide moderately priced sale and rental units in new
developments. Over 8,000 units had been produced since
1974. Under this program, developers of over 50 units were
initially required, in exchange for a 20 percent density
bonus, to allocate 12.5 percent of the development to
moderately priced units. Under the law, the Housing
Opportunities Commission maintained an option to purchase
one-third of the MPDUs in each subdivision for its use. The
density bonus and MPDU requirement percentages were revised
in 1988 to go up to 22 percent and 15 percent respectively.
A second amendment provided that 40 percent of the MPDU
units be set-aside for purchase by HOC and local nonprofit
organizations for permanently affordable housing.
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According to MHP staff, passage of this amendment
represented both a growing recognition of the affordable
housing problem in Montgomery County and a legitimization of
the role of nonprofits in providing this type of housing.
Four nonprofits were qualified to purchase MPDUs in 1988.
Each of these nonprofits undertook a somewhat different path
to providing affordable housing. When a MPDU became
available, these nonprofits negotiated among themselves to
determine the buyer of the unit. HOC developed a strong
working relationship with these nonprofits and became "a
valuable resource of knowledge and expertise."
Organizational History
The group which formed the The Montgomery Housing
Partnership, Inc. (MHP) during the fall of 1988 also
proposed the MPDU amendment providing the nonprofit purchase
option. MHP had its creation in the concerns and commitment
for affordable housing expressed by dedicated citizens and
clergy at that time. Two persons who became MHP Board
members and MHP's first executive vice president, who had
been a manager at the Montgomery Housing Opportunities
Commission and a successful housing consultant, spoke on
behalf of the MPDU amendment at the Council's legislative
hearing in July 1988. MHP's president also played a key
role in adoption of the amendment in his capacity at that
time as Chairman of the County Planning Board. Following
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the July hearing, the Community Ministry of Montgomery
County, representing the group forming MHP, forwarded a
letter to the Montgomery County Council in September
suggesting "one of the greatest features of the Montgomery
Housing Partnership - besides being a way to keep MPDU's
affordable - is its potential for expanding the base of
support for affordable housing" and requesting the Council's
"support and critical review."
The original proposal was to establish a nonprofit
mutual housing partnership, an approach patterned after the
European concept of mutual housing associations. Organizers
proposed the County join "a collaborative effort by
religious and civic organizations, employers, bankers,
business groups, (and) charitable organizations, including
the housing beneficiaries themselves." The initial target
population was planned to serve households at or slightly
below the income of those served by the unsubsidized portion
of the MPDU program, with contributions reducing the housing
costs of some residents.
The Community Ministry of Montgomery County continued
its support. Interested parties held initial meetings
throughout the autumn of 1988, with articles of
incorporations and by laws adopted on January 9, 1989.
Discussion of potential Board members reemphasized the need
for representatives from the business, civic, lending,
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building, and religious communities, as well as from
potential program beneficiaries. Over the next several
months, proposals to create an action plan were introduced
and coordination with other groups planned. A finance
committee was also formed, followed by the appointment of
tenant selection/occupancy and fund raising committees. HOC
offerred the first unit in May under the MPDU nonprofit
amendment. The Montgomery Housing Partnership served as
the back-up purchaser to the Bethesda Interfaith Housing
Coalition, an ecumenically-backed group focusing primarily
upon transitional housing for the homeless.
In May, the Board also turned once again to discussions
of MHP's overall direction. The May Board meeting minutes
stated that "a lengthy discussion of the issue ended with
no specific votes taken. The general direction was toward
MHP serving broad based affordable housing needs within the
County, rather than attempting to develop programs
comparable to those of other organizations presently serving
special needs groups, and including consideration of
homeownership as well as rental and cooperative approaches."
At the end of May, MHP began preparing for MHP's first
purchase of its own MPDU.
Following this purchase,the Board selected a private
management agent in July, based upon a below-market bid, the
firm's experience in managing lower income units, and
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discussions of specific tenant selection policies and
leasing requirements. The Board's Management and Tenant
Selection Committee proposed numerous guidelines which were
debated by the entire Board. The Board agreed to make
County residency "a preference . . . with a particular
preference for those who work or have been offered jobs in
the County." Discussions of tenant selection criteria
focused on "the desirability of maximizing uses of the units
in terms of the priority for addressing other needs; for
example, single parent households and families paying a
high percentage of income for rent. Ultimately, the Board
determined that these priorities could be sorted out in the
future, with the tenant selection policy to be implemented
in a flexible manner for the Normandy Crest unit now
available." The Board also ruled out a specific rent to
income ratio requirement, allowing a tenant to pay a higher
percentage of income for rent in limited situations.
During the summer, MHP consolidated its relationship
with the County's Department of Housing and Community
Development and with HOC. While MHP continued to assist and
coordinate its activities with other nonprofits, it deferred
a request to participate in a Single Room Occupancy (SRO)
proposal with Shepherd's Table, a local nonprofit, and
limited its participation in Neighborhoods Together, a
nonprofit coalition. In July, Friends of MHP formed, and
the Board planned a fund - raiser for October. Additional
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Board member appointments and a search for permanent
office space also began.
The fall was spent primarily in further delineating the
authority and responsibilities of MHP's Board, executive,
finance, and management and tenant selection committees, and
staff. MHP's president and one of its Board members,
serving as members of a County Council technical committee
created to review the Productivity Plan, became actively
involved in bringing recognition to nonprofit housing
development. A memo to the Board from MHP's president noted
the Plan "gave no recognition either to HOC or to non-profit
groups in terms of housing development. The Technical
Committee immediately expanded the scope to include
reference both to HOC's activities and to non-profit
efforts."
A combination October fundraiser and retirement tribute
brought MHP favorable recognition. The tribute recognized
MHP's new president, who had recently retired from public
service, having been a member of the County Council and
later Chairman of the County's Planning Board. A memo to
the Board's Finance Committee noted the additional support
of MHP's activities from local banks. "We find ourselves in
the unexpected position of being courted by our local
lenders. This is undoubtedly due to the influence of the
requirements of the Community Reinvestment Act and the more
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sweeping mandate for affordable housing contained in the
recent Federal bail-out legislation, spurred by publicity
about the tribute to Norm earlier this month. Given the
level of support expressed by the banks, we would like to
solicit your thoughts on a strategy for working with the
banks, keeping as many as possible involved and interested."
Local bankers expressed "ready recognition of the
strength of our Board of Directors, commenting "specifically
on the broad range of experience and expertise in the Board.
All of them were impressed by our report that much of our
original seed money came from a group of developers and that
our recent fundraiser assured the funding of our first
year's operating budget. The bankers were also receptive to
MHP's objective to address the "strong low - to - moderate
income housing need for support, custodial, and service
personnel (including bank tellers) as well as entry - level
professionals. They quickly ackowledged the problem of
service and support staff, saying that they were forced to
provide 'combat pay' adjustments to keep bank staff in
Bethesda in particular."
During this period, staff also developed a preliminary
outline of a business plan for MHP delineating program goals
and objectives, target markets, administration and staffing,
permanent financing, and special outreach to employers.
Plans referenced proposals to "increase staff as
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developments reach feasibility stage, use of consultants,
advisory committees, volunteers, and interns and to support
the operating budget long term through combination of
ongoing local contributions and revenues from acquisition/
development activities." In terms of target markets and
specific implementation plans, recognition was given that a
higher percentage of lower income could be served by joint
venture developments," using tax credit financing.
Staff met with legal counsel, who had previously
advised the Enterprise Foundation, to determine the tax
consequences of MHP creating for-profit subsidiaries and
developing joint venture arrangements with for-profit
corporations. "We assume at this point that MHP would serve
as a limited partner in the development, but in any case,
not as the money general partner. Staff does not envision
MHP serving as a general partner at this stage for a variety
of reasons, including our lack of net worth." Legal counsel
recommended "establishing a paper trail documenting our
policies and procedures," and staff concluded, "Over time,
it would be helpful to establish general policies regarding
our goals and minimum requirements for developments in
various forms of ownership, e.g. MHP-owned rental;
MHP/privately owned rental; and MHP-sponsored sale and
cooperatively owned housing. Within this framework, we can
then set specific objectives for individual developments."
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From its inception, MHP had the dual goals of
creating and preserving "more affordable housing for
families unable to compete in Montgomery County's high
priced housing market." MHP's participation in the MPDU
program was planned to facilitate the goal of preserving
affordable housing. In addition, MHP made offers to
purchase existing apartment projects in order to preserve
their affordability. These activities did not directly
serve the goal of creating additional affordable housing,
since developers still provided these units if they were not
optioned by HOC or a certified nonprofit organization. The
goal of providing additional units required MHP to "look for
opportunites to build new housing."
In September 1989, MHP was approached by Orchard
Development Corporation headquartered in Columbia, Maryland,
to participate in a joint venture to develop a 67 unit
garden apartment complex located on Robey Road within
Montgomery County's Route 29 corridor. Due to inadequate
public facilities in the corridor, preliminary development
plans for the site had been held up at the approval stage
for several years. Initially, Orchard was interested in
responding to HOC's request for proposals for affordable
housing developments that would meet the guidelines for
exceptions to the Annual Growth Policy in areas presently
closed to additional development and which could reach
subdivision approval by June 30, 1990. Since each planning
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area was limited to 250 units each year under the affordable
housing exception, HOC used the RFP process to weigh the
merits of competing developments.
After further consideration, Orchard Develoment's staff
decided too many issues were outstanding to consider
submitting a proposal on their own. Orchard then turned to
MHP to facilitate development of the parcel. MHP's staff
questioned the threshold criteria for its involvement "in
terms of the basic objectives the project must achieve." The
two threshold objectives discussed with Orchard were:
1. The development must achieve a higher public
purpose than the minimum required, i.e. either a larger
number of units serving lower income households, or more
very low income households served than would otherwise be
the case.
2. The units serving lower income households must be
retained permanently in the affordable housing stock, as
opposed to the 20 year period now typical.
Orchard was willing to accept these conditions
"assuming we can make the numbers work," and MHP was faced
with a major question of how best to structure the
Partnership's involvement. "Orchard is willing to consider
a wide range of options from having MHP serve as a
consultant, assisting in obtaining tax exempt financing for
example to 100% initial ownership by MHP if needed to obtain
the financing and other assistance that would make the deal
viable, with a resale in the future." Orchard proposed
splitting equally the $50,000 developer's fee "to help cover
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our costs of working on the deal, even if we have no equity
stake, along with the possibility of either or both a share
of annual cash flow and residual value at the resale."
In December, Orchard Development withdrew from
negotiations to acquire the Robey Road property after
extended negotiations with the owner failed to reach an
acceptable purchase price. Orchard approached MHP to
continue the project alone. MHP's president wrote, "Unable
to convince the owner to accept the purchase price, they
believe there may be a higher chance for success if MHP
approaches the owner directly with a proposal based on 100%
nonprofit ownership of the development." Orchard agreed to
serve in a development and management role on a fee basis to
the extent desired by MHP if the sale were successful.
Orchard's withdrawal raised "the threshold question of is
MHP interested in pursuing this development on its own,
recognizing that we would need somewhere in the range of
$40,000 to $80,000 in upfront capital to do so, and that the
risks - as well as the rewards - would be borne solely by
the Partnership."
Once the Board approved the decision to proceed alone,
MHP began preliminary negotiations to acquire the property.
In gaining the owner's agreement, MHP staff detailed the
complexity of the local development approvals process and
the "several factors that must be taken into account in
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evaluating the situation." These factors included the
residential subdivision moratorium and the limited
affordable housing exception. Most critical to the detailed
structuring of a project on this site were the presence of a
70 foot master plan road right-of-way that limited design
options and the below-fifty-unit size of the original
Orchard proposal.
Negotiations over specific sales terms continued until
the end of February when a contingent sales agreement was
reached for purchase of 3.8 acres, 0.74 acre more than the
original Orchard parcel, for $600,000. The terms provided
that "if fewer than 67 units are aproved at site plan
review, the price will be adjusted to $10,800 per unit
exclusive of the required MPDU's." The agreement also
provided MHP with 150 days from execution of the contract to
verify title and to seek approval of the affordable housing
exception by HOC, financing, environmental reviews, and
subdivision preliminary plans, including the abandonment of
the right-of-way.
The Board and the property's owner agreed to a
contract in late March, and MHP turned to the tasks of
revising the pending subdivision plan and applying for a
certification of the project as an affordable housing
exception to the County's Annual Growth Policy. The
approvals process required submission of numerous studies,
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including environmental, traffic engineering, wetlands
delineation, and a title report. MHP staff felt confident
that "we are likely to be successful in avoiding the street
extension. It would provide a connection to Robey Road that
is of questionable value, and construction would be
expensive because of a sharp grade change on the adjacent
property."
To keep costs to a minimum and "fast track" the
approvals process MHP contacted the original engineers who
had worked for Orchard and considered utilizing Orchard's
original building plans. MHP's president also suggested
submitting the project to HOC for certification before
completion of the revised preliminary plan, "because there
is now great competition for the affordable housing
exception to the subdivision moratorium in this area. We
also propose to ask HOC to waive the $1,000 application fee
and to assist us in expediting the subdivision plan."
In applying to HOC for the affordable housing exception
in early April, MHP again affirmed its commitment to
"providing more than the minimum qualifying number of below
market units." MHP's transmittal letter to HOC reflected
MHP's thinking:
It is our intention to keep this
project in the 'affordable'
category permanently and to
increase the number of below-market
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units as project economics permit.
Since the equity needed will be
raised through a variety of
sources, including grants and loans
from corporations, individuals, and
foundation, the decision whether to
use the cash flow increases to
subsidize more units will be
influenced by our need to repay
loans or our need for capital for
other projects. The decision will
be made in the context of
maximizing our ability to increase
and preserve the County's supply of
affordable housing.
HOC approved the affordable housing exception to the
annual growth policy and waived its $1,000 application fee
in April, and MHP's Board approved a search for a
development consultant to expedite work on the Robey Road
project. In May, MHP agreed to employ DeSantis Investments,
Inc., whose president had been affiliated with Orchard, to
undertake a variety of assignments including preliminary
design and feasibility and financing.
While MHP was negotiating its purchase contract, HOC
successfully acquired an adjacent 2.21 acre parcel. Upon
learning of this acquisition, MHP staff suggested the
desirability of coordinating project design and possibly
joint development. HOC was also negotiating with another
adjacent property owner, The Milton Company, who was
developing the Vineyards condominium community, and HOC had
suggested that "HOC sell its land to Milton and buy
condominium units throughout the Vineyards project." MHP
staff met with HOC in May to discuss development
ill
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alternatives and learned of HOC's possible interest in
acquiring MHP's parcel. HOC's Executive Director then
raised the possibility of selling their site to MHP. In a
response to HOC which profusely expressed appreciation of
HOC's support and "interest in serving as a public partner
in MHP's efforts," MHP's president reiterated:
We consider it absolutely
essential that MHP establish its
identity with this first
development project. This
objective is, in fact, the driving
force behind our decisions on these
alternatives. From this
discussion, I am sure it is obvious
that the strongest preferences of
our Board would be for us to
develop the larger project that
would result from our purchase of
the HOC land. If the Commission is
interested in this approach, we
would very much like to pursue this
alternative as soon as possible.
At their May 30 meeting, the Housing Opportunities
Commission authorized their staff to negotiate for the sale
of their parcel to MHP to cover its purchase price plus
costs incurred up to closing. This price represented a
significant opportunity for MHP to increase the number of
anticipated affordable housing units, since HOC had
originally purchased the property at a bargain sale price
equivalent to less than $8,000 per unit. HOC requested that
MHP submit a contract outlining its public purpose
objectives and giving HOC the right to step in if MHP failed
to move the project forward. HOC also requested MHP to
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consider including a small community room planned for the
use of residents and HOC, which MHP found acceptable.
In July, MHP submitted a preliminary subdivision plan
for the combined MHP/HOC parcels to the Montgomery County
Planning Board. MHP's board approved a tax-exempt financing
plan for the Robey Road site. As a significant new
construction project, Robey Road offered both the
opportunity and necessity of seeking new financial and
organizational resources. MHP staff identified two
financing options: tax-exempt bond financing and low-income
tax credit syndication. Staff explored these options with
analytical help from the Enterprise Social Investment
Corporation (ESIC), the wholly owned for-profit subsidiary
of the Enterprise Foundation. Staff expected ESIC to bring
both objective expertise and valuable credibility to the
deal structuring. It had been very active in syndicating
tax credit projects throughout the country and had gained an
excellent reputation in Maryland. Through its contacts,
ESIC could also introduce MHP to the larger world of
foundations and corporate philanthropy. However, MHP
experienced long delays in obtaining the requested credit
pricing information.
The bond financing approach required less front-end
analytical support, although this alternative also required
extensive outside technical expertise in its implementation.
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As structured, MHP staff anticipated the bond option would
require a temporary loan to cover front end costs, a
deferred payment second trust, and a loan guarantee from the
County to reach an acceptable 1.1 debt service coverage,
which they thought would be forthcoming as a contingent
liability. To achieve financial feasibility the development
also required the assistance of a site acquisition bargain
sale, a payment in lieu of taxes for very low income units,
and partial deferral of servicing fees. Staff postulated
that the more creative loan guarantee approach would be
especially welcomed, since it expended fewer funds than the
equity approach to increasing the debt coverage.
MHP staff also considered the bond financing's relative
ease of implementation. Several Board and staff members
were concerned about the legal complexity of syndication,
although they had considerable tax credit experience. In a
memo to the Board, MHP's president stated, "I do not think
we should take the route that is more complicated, demanding
greater staff time and effort." Nonetheless, both MHP's
staff and Board expressed interest in attempting a tax
credit project in the near future.
The type of financing selected had a direct impact on
the project's feasible mix of unit types and sizes and the
acceptable range of tenant incomes. The tax credit project
was structured to offer all of its units at below market
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rents. The bond project contained 74 market rate units
which could become below market units as the project's debt
is repaid. Some Board members expressed concern that market
rate units were being offered, but the Board consensus
reflected the sentiments of MHP's president who concluded:
There are real social benefits to
having a wider range of incomes in
such a project, and there is a
public image benefit to MHP. If our
first project is 100% below-market,
then neighborhood objections to
future projects will be strength-
-ened. I believe we and the
community are better off if we have
six projects with 50% of the units
below market than three projects
with 100% below market. I believe
we will also be in a stronger
position to attract grants or loans
from employers if we are serving a
broader spectrum of people who
cannot afford to live in the
County.
The tax credit also represented a potentially more
risky financing approach, since the allocation of credits
available to nonprofits each year in Maryland was limited.
Timing of a tax credit project was more critical and award
less certain given this restriction. Tax credit projects
also represented a less secure investment strategy for
long term affordability until MHP could gain control of
the terms of syndication.
Summarizing the Board's actions regarding Robey Road's
financing and subsidy alternatives, minutes reported: "The
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Board unanimously approved moving ahead with 501 (c)(3)
bonds to finance the Robey Road development with 70% of the
units at market rents, 20% affordable to households at 50%
of area median income and an additional 10% of the units
affordable to households at 60% of median. Three key
reasons were cited by various Board members in selecting
this approach in lieu of the tax credit approach, under
which all of the units would serve households at 60% of
median: ease of implementation, particularly in light of
MHP's limited staff resources; a desire for a development of
this size to serve households with a range of incomes,
recognizing that the market rents proposed are not at luxury
levels, and the ability to retain long - term control over
development." With the method of financing and unit mix
determined, MHP staff began negotiations to select a
builder, management agent, and market analyst- appraiser.
"It looks like we have a 'go' Project."
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Chapter VI. Case Analysis
This chapter will utilize the four stages of innovation
(idea generation, coalition building, idea realization, and
transfer) and the four organizational frames (structural,
human resource, symbolic, and political) to analyze the
findings of the field research described above. General
findings for each stage and frame will be explored, followed
by a more specific discussion of the findings regarding each
organization.
Stages of Innovation
Each stage of innovation reflects the chronological and
substantive progress of an organizational innovation. To
document the progress that each housing development program
innovation, the unit of analysis, makes as it moves from
design through implementation, each organization's
innovation is examined utilizing the stages of innovation
process. These findings are summarized in Table I. As
reviewed in the literature, the development of innovation,
like the development of organizations, is not often a linear
or continuous process. Innovations, and entire
organizations, often cycle back and forth between stages,
and some portions of the organization and the innovation may
lag or accelerate beyond others. Nonetheless, the stages of
innovation proved to be a highly descriptive and useful
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method to track innovation through each organization's
history and development.
Idea Generation
In this first stage of innovation, an idea moves from
conception to activation of the innovation. This phase
represents the triggering of the innovation idea into
action. In both MUSCLE and MHP, the first key innovation
action was the decision to pursue an individual development
opportunity. For MUSCLE, it began with the purchase of
three townhomes in the Shaw neighborhood. MHP began with a
joint venture proposal to develop the Robey Rd. apartments.
As a housing counseling agency, MUSCLE's decision to
undertake its own development was more radical than MHP's
decision, which was predicated more directly upon MHP's
founding objectives. It took MUSCLE six years to undertake
its first development; MHP took less than a year.
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Table I. Stages of Innovation
Stage MUSCLE
Idea Generation
Coalition Building
Vacant Housing
Program
Creation of
Fund
Board Expansion
MHP
Robey Rd. Joint
Venture
"Threshold
Criteria"
Developed
Decision to
"Go It Alone"
Implementing
Philosophy
Contract
Negotiation
Idea Realization Development
Oversight
Committee
Sale of
Colonnade
HOC Approvals
Plans and
studies
Transfer Portfolio
Diversification
Financing
Equity Fund
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Coalition Building
After moving from conception to action, the innovation
must gain support and backing from key organizational
players, both from within and outside the organization.
This sponsorship symbolizes the "championing" of the
innovation past its first tests of legitimacy and
feasibility. Once again, development represented a bigger
"stretch" for MUSCLE. After approving the townhouse
development, it moved to a larger and more complicated
vacant apartment conversion. These early efforts to move
into development were bolstered by community support and the
creation of a development fund, but its internal
organization struggled to accomodate these projects. During
this period, MUSCLE's Board was expanded to attract
additional funding and to represent the broader interests of
the larger community MUSCLE was beginning to serve. The
Board spent considerable energy developing and approving
MUSCLE's "implementing philosophy" and rules of procedure.
MHP's support also began with the development of
"threshold criteria" to guide selection of development
projects, but its staff and Board were able to approach the
project decision much more like a business planning decision
given housing development's prominence in its original
mission and objectives. Its lines of support and access to
the community were also more established as a result of the
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professional background and orientation of its Board and
staff. MHP's broad support from a cross-section of
Montgomery County's leadership greatly facilitated its entry
into its first development project.
Idea Realization
The third task of the innovation process turns the
innovation into reality. In the case of MUSCLE, this phase
occurred with the formation of a Board Development Oversight
Committee and dedication of funds generated from the sale of
MUSCLE's largest asset, the Colonnade Apartments. With
these events, MUSCLE completed the transition into housing
development and was positioned to secure the program's
short term future.
MUSCLE, on the other hand, was able to end its
successful contract negotiations for the Robey Rd. property
and move immediately into predevelopment submissions and
approvals. In the process of deciding to "go it alone", it
had won HOC's agreement to sell MHP its adjacent parcel,
creating a significant development opportunity and building
goodwill and access to local funds as it proceeded.
Transfer
The culmination of innovation production is the diffusion or
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institutionalization of the innovation throughout the
organization. This is a process which extends the
innovation beyond implementation and requires many other
"people, activities, patterns and structures to change to
incorporate the innovation" (Kanter, 1987, 47). It is an
integrative process, although it may also set the stage for
the next innovation idea to begin its way toward
implementation. MUSCLE's transfer centered on its decisions
to diversify its portfolio and to establish an Equity Fund.
MHP's transfer focused upon its selection of funding
alternatives and its creative strategy to add lower income
units over time to its projects.
Organizational Frames
The four organizational frames serve as independent
lenses to describe organizational innovation from different
perspectives. For purposes of analysis, each frame has a
unique comparative advantage. Each emphasizes a different
aspect of the organization, and as a result, "each
perspective enacts a different image of the organization"
(Bolman and Deal, 237). In total the frames produces a
useful analytical perspective of organizational innovation
as a "cross-cutting" phenonemon affecting the entire
organization. These findings are summarized in Table II.
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Table II. Organizational Frames
MUSCLE
Frame
Structural
Human Resource
Symbolic
Political
Representative Board
Move toward
development
staffing
Top down
Specialists
Task differentiation
Advocates
Charismatic leader
Job creation and
recruitment
Process
Very low income
Ownership, community
Cooperative
Strategic alliances
MHP
Professional Board
Experienced
development
staff
Organic
Generalists
Integrative
tasks
Service Providers
Charismatic leader
Use of consultants
Product
Mixed income
Affordability,
permanence
Cooperative
Strategic ventures
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The Structural Frame
The structural frame concentrates upon the scope and
the effect of innovation upon organization. Its concerns
are with the central and peripheral activities of the
organization and their interactions with both the
administrative and technical aspects of the organization's
structure. In this sense, this frame is concerned with both
the structure and the functions of the organization.
Both MUSCLE and MHP exhibited organic structures common
to entrepreneurial organizations. Organization was both
simple and dynamic with little job hierarchy. As an older
and larger organization, MUSCLE exhibited more
differentation in both its activities and its efforts to
specialize staff functions. The primary structural emphasis
in both organizations, as Valedeck suggested in his general
discussion of nonprofits, was the staff relationship to the
Board. Board members were actively involved individually
and through committee structures in both policy development
and on-going project monitoring throughout the innovation
process. However, MUSCLE's Board was more interactive and
policy-oriented due to the greater uncertainty surrounding
the organization's entry into development. MHP's Board also
debated policy, especially regarding prospective tenant
income mixes, but was able to focus more directly upon the
"business" decisions of development without restructure or
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radical change to its composition or relations with MHP's
staff.
MUSCLE
MUSCLE began its operation relying on volunteers and
borrowing heavily from the resources of local churches. It
grew rapidly. Its early years, which were extremely
productive, might be characterized as a period of maturing
administrative and financial transition. MUSCLE began its
innovation into housing development as a result of a growing
number of vacant buildings and Washington's urgent need for
affordable housing.
MUSCLE also recognized the development of vacant
housing as a vehicle to assist itself in becoming
self-sufficient. Projects such as the rehabilitation of the
CCNV shelter generated fees and brought MUSCLE favorable
press, but did little to increase its capital base. The
move into the redevelopment of occupied housing was a
further effort to advance MUSCLE's dual goals of providing
affordable housing and creating a revenue base to fund its
on-going operation.
125
Montgomery Housing Partnership
MHP began with similar support from Montgomery
County's religious community. It also was created with the
dual objectives of providing affordable housing and becoming
self-sufficient, but its innovation of moving into
large-scale housing development was included as a goal of
its original mission statement. Rather than defining its
mission, MHP spent most of its early years in delineating
program objectives and developing a business plan. Although
limited, its funding sources were more secure than MUSCLE's.
In this sense, it acted more like an organization "born
mature" (Clay, 1986).
In many ways, MHP's entry into development was a less
radical departure from its original mission. Since it came
earlier in its organizational history and was more central
to its original mission, MHP also placed greater symbolic
importance on its first development project. Like MUSCLE,
however, MHP was also aware of the limits of its staff
capacity. For this reason, its choice of funding for its
first large scale development project, Robey Road, was
predicated in large part upon its relative ease of
implementation.
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The Human Resources Frame
The human resources frame focuses upon the
interpersonal elements of organizational leadership,
motivation and morale, and professional standards. It also
considers the manner in which an organization learns from
its experiences and transmits this knowledge to its members
and constituents. MUSCLE and MHP are both organizations led
by charismatic leaders with long tenure and experience
working in their respective communities. Both organizations
emphasize their unique competence and professional ability
to produce affordable housing. However, this convergence
emerged from diverse beginnings. MUSCLE's Board originally
consisted of ministers representing congregations located in
southwest Washington. Its lay representatives were added to
reflect its expanded scope of service and its increased
needs for professional advice and funding. MHP's Board
began with both clerical support and professional
representation. Its membership search has been principally
to expand its community representation.
MUSCLE
With its beginnings as a housing counseling agency,
MUSCLE's initial staff and Board orientation was closely
aligned to its original clients. As its mission shifted to
housing development and partnerships with the private
127
sector, these new sensitivities and skill requirements were
necessarily added to their agenda. MUSCLE instituted a
multi-year planning process and an annual Board retreat
which reaffirmed the agency's mission and facilitated
project reviews and program innovations. The Board turned
to written staff reports and detailed guidelines to improve
its monitoring of projects and to further facilitate
implementation of these innovations. This searching has
made the innovation process more difficult as the Board and
staff have attempted to align their priorities and
awareness.
MHP
Even though MHP also began as a community - supported
organization, it has always been a more professionally
interactive organization, and staff activities reflect this
orientation. Its staff background includes extensive
involvement with Montgomery County's governmental agencies
and business community, with whom it began to interact
immediately. As a former member of the County Council and
Chairman of the County's Planning Board, MHP's president was
able to turn his retirement into a successful fundraiser for
MHP. Its Board also represented the County's professional
and political "movers and shakers". As a result of this
integration, MHP has moved more quickly to initiate
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projects, engage professional consultants, and to develop
partnerships within the community. Staff has related well
to this process and has guided the Board through its
decision-making utilizing extensive project reporting and
site visits.
The Symbolic Frame
The symbolic frame concentrates most directly upon
organizational culture and climate and its representation in
the development and execution of the organizational mission.
The nonprofit aspects of MUSCLE and MHP symbolically
nurtured their innovative development activity by attracting
and retaining staff and Board members that related well to
each organization's purpose and practices. Externally, it
also legitimated the organizational search for projects and
funding within the community and provided a vehicle for
promoting each organization's public purpose. This
symbolism also represents a potential barrier to innovation,
however. Nonprofit organizations are often prevented by
popular belief, conventional wisdom, and legal restrictions
from taking undue development risks or competing unfairly
with for - profit businesses. Both MUSCLE and MHP were
served well by the legitimating symbols of nonprofit
enterprise, but as a result, they were also held to a higher
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standard of developing more affordable housing than the
market or government acting alone could provide.
MUSCLE
From its inception, MUSCLE's has worked to position
itself as a competent housing crusader. Its initial
religious support formed the underpinnings of its
orientation and casts its mission in the twin beliefs of
neighborhood preservation and homeownership. These beliefs
led MUSCLE's staff and Board to serve the lowest income
groups feasible and to undertake projects in areas that were
not marketable because of substandard housing conditions.
As federal funding for low income housing diminished,
MUSCLE continued to maintain its original mission of serving
the lowest income groups possible, but project feasibility
began to direct MUSCLE toward projects that assisted greater
numbers of moderate income persons. This turn of events led
MUSCLE's Board to question involvement in these projects.
This questionning led to MUSCLE's innovatively seeking
development projects and alternative funding sources that
would bolster its founding mission to serve the very low
income, while allowing MUSCLE to respond to a broader range
of project opportunities and development initiatives.
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Montgomery Housing Partnership
While targeting the income groups to be served was not
as much an issue with MHP, its mission to provide affordable
housing reflected similar concerns. At the hearing amending
MPDU guidelines, MHP was originally cast as an organization
that would promote mutual housing, an ownership concept much
like MUSCLE's initial cooperative approach. While this
approach was tabled, the symbolism was retained. MHP staff
and Board reaffirmed this commitment soon after
incorporation. The provision of permanently affordable
housing units became a threshold criterion for MHP entering
into a development project. As a further condition, MHP's
involvement must also attempt to add value by increasing the
number of affordable units within each project over time
through the use of creative financing or other means of
subsidy.
The Political Frame
The political frame relates the organization to its
external environment. Sources of support and conflict with
other organizations and the larger community are considered
within this frame. Joint ventures and collaborations with
government, local funders, and other nonprofits are the
principal domain of the political frame. The focus is upon
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the relationship and the process of its development. Both
MUSCLE and MHP exhibited a high degree of innovation and
cooperation in their relations with their external
environments. Both organizations quickly broadened their
bases of support and their entrepreneurial involvement in
innovative development projects, although both set limits to
their collaboration based upon organizational mission and
resources.
MUSCLE
As described above, MUSCLE's early political support
came principally from the religious community. It quickly
extended to the larger community. As its participation in
the District's housing programs evolved and its staff began
contributing its talents to other local housing initiatives,
MUSCLE's support and endorsement also expanded. This
support, and its willingness and creative ability to
structure tax credit and bond financed projects, have led
MUSCLE to increase its innovative involvement in development
projects. This involvement grew to include joint venture
projects with private developers and most recently, with
limited equity cooperative groups. Its association with
local banks has also led the way to creation of a privately
financed equity fund.
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Montgomery Housing Partnership
Perhaps MHP's greatest strength is its strong support
from such quarters as Montgomery County's Housing
Opportunities Commission and many of its private developers.
Coming from a local government planning and development
background, MHP's staff has been able to maximize its
contacts and knowledge of local development regulations.
Its Board also has been actively involved in this process.
This involvement has greatly leveraged MHP's ability to
negotiate development projects entrepreneurially and to
access local funding sources innovatively.
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Chapter VII. Conclusions
This concluding chapter reexamines the earlier
hypotheses regarding innovation based upon findings of the
literature review and analysis of the field data. It is
followed by a closing observation regarding the importance
and future study of innovation within enterprising nonprofit
community development corporations.
Hypothesis
Enterprising nonprofit community development corporations,
like other entrepreneurial organizations, are an
organizational form that promotes innovation.
As described in the literature, nonprofit community
development corporations represent a unique organizational
form created to respond to the urgent needs of many inner
city neighborhoods left unserved or underserved by the
shortcomings of other public and private institutions (Clay,
Mayer and Blake, Pierce and Steinbach). This failing
suggests an entrepreneurial mandate, but not necessarily an
innovative one. Numerous forces act to impede CDC
innovation, including lack of funding and expertise,
community resistance to change, and legal restrictions
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applying to nonprofit enterprise. Other factors, such as
risk-taking, organizational flexibility, Board support, and
collaborative partnerships tend to support their innovation.
This thesis has revealed the innovative accomplishments
of two enterprising CDCs from very different environments.
MUSCLE began as a participatory housing counseling agency
that has moved toward professionalism in its affordable
housing development programs. MHP began as a more
professionally oriented nonprofit that is moving toward a
more representative and inclusive affordable housing
development strategy. The move into development was more
radical for MUSCLE and has taken longer to accomplish, but
both organizations have moved beyond the risk - taking
characteristic of entrepreneurial organizations.
Both organizations have been successful in their push
to move beyond "basic job - as - given accomplishments" to
innovation. Their Boards and staffs have worked closely
together to assume the challenges of innovation. Similar to
Kanter's (1983, 378) findings in the corporate world, their
innovations have included "new policies, new structures, new
methods or technological processes, and new products or
market opportunities." In support of their missions and in
the face of great uncertainty, they have been both
entrepreneurial and innovative.
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Hypothesis
The factors influencing innovation within enterprising
nonprofit community development corporations follow generic
stages of innovation that can be chronicled from design to
implementation.
This thesis has embraced the expansive definition of
innovation as the generation, acceptance, and implementation
of new ideas, processes, products, or services. Under this
definition, an invention, which may be any new problem -
solving or goal - serving opportunity, must move from
creation to execution to be considered an innovation. While
the innovation process may appear non - linear, and may
have occurred differently in another organizational
setting, most classic organizational studies have found that
innovation follows predictable stages from design to
implementation. As a result, the stages of innovation
process may be utilized to track organizational events to
determine if in fact an innovation did occur, and in
conjunction with organizational frames analysis, to explore
the factors contributing to the innovation.
In exploring the innovative processes of MUSCLE and
MHP, this study has found the stages of innovation approach
to be a useful descriptive tool to delineate the paths of
nonprofit organizational innovation. Both MUSCLE and MHP
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exhibited discrete periods that could be easily categorized
as idea generation, coalition building, idea realization, or
transfer (Table I). From the perspective of those who
participated in the events, these stages were discernable
through field research, interviews, and document reviews.
However, individual events often exhibited some
characteristics of both the stage that proceeded and the
stage that followed the event. For example, MHP's Robey
Road plan approvals, described as part of the idea
realization implementation stage, were initiated during the
coalition building stage as part of the contract
negotiations process. Innovations, like organizations,
appear to cycle within and across stages, suggesting the
opportunity within nonprofit research to further refine
these stages to include substages of innovation similar to
Zaltman and Duncan's (1977) model.
Hypothesis
The factors influencing innovation within enterprising
nonprofit community development corporations are discernable
as a collective vision of four organizational frames:
structural, human resource, symbolic, and political.
Organizational frames serve to reveal the factors and
conditions of innovation within each stage of the innovation
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process. As the innovation travels from design to
implementation and transfer, each frame takes on a different
prominence, focusing upon the different factors of
innovation featured within that frame. Consequently, each
frame's descriptive powers reflects the prominence of that
frame's activities within the organization during that stage
of innovation.
As nonprofit organizations, the strucutural and
symbolic frames assumed greater prominence for both MUSCLE
and MHP during the idea generation and consensus building
stages. This was especially true for MUSCLE, which
struggled more in the beginning to modify its mission to
include citywide housing development. As entrepreneurial
organizations, the political frame assumed greater
significance during the coalition building and
implementation stages as both organizations sought
collaborative support and funding from the community. The
human resource frame appeared of greater significance to
MUSCLE as it professionalized its staff and Board during
these same stages. MHP's human resource frame appeared less
prominent throughout and did not vary significantly from its
professional orientation during any of the innovation
stages, although this may change as MHP grows.
These findings reflect the same commitments to
opportunity and resources that Stevenson, et al. (1989)
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recognized as pulling individuals toward entrepreneurial
behavior. From a broader perspective, they also reflect the
organizational and environmental commitments and the
"cohesive pattern of managerial behavior" that appear to
support organizational innovation. These summary findings
suggest that organizational frame analysis is an appropriate
and productive vehicle to explore the factors of innovation
within nonprofit community development corporations.
Further research should continue to explore the sensitivity
of frame analysis to variations in individual organizations,
the nature of the innovation, and the stages of innovation
process.
Epilogue
Like most dilemmas facing enterprising nonprofit
community development corporations, the management of their
innovation is not a simple matter of clearly "understanding
one's strategic options," for "old and new technology, and
old and new markets," as is the recommended strategy for
managing innovation within high technology firms (Patz,
1986, 59). Among other environmental factors, chronic
capital shortages have made program innovation difficult for
these community development corporation. As Vladeck (77)
concludes, "organizations that budget to break even at
existing operational levels, (which) have little by way of
reserves, and have difficulty obtaining access to venture
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capital cannot innovate as well as they should." On the
other hand, many theorists have expressed fear "that as
nonprofits increasingly generate revenues through charges
for services, they may neglect their original mission and
ultimately lose their legitimacy" (Ferris and Grady, 129).
As Drucker (1985, 30) has concluded, "Innovation is the
act that endows resources with a new capacity to create
wealth. Innovation, indeed, creates a resource." As such,
nonprofit innovation is both the source and palliative of
these "revenue-dependency theory" concerns. A search of the
literature on nonprofit profit management reveals very
little case material based upon community development
corporations dealing with these issues. Evidence of the
impact of enterprise and innovation on the behavior of these
nonprofit organizations is even more limited.
Enterprising community development corporations offer
great hope to affordable housing and to community problem -
solving and great challenge to organizational theorists,
community funding sources and public policy makers. In
essence, there is potential conflict within every enterprise
and with every innovation, but there is also potential for
what Kanter has called "the blooming of a thousand flowers."
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